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Stepping into the Gap: Violent Crime Victims, the
Right to Closure, and a Discursive Shift Away from
Zero Sum Resolutions
Blanche Bong Cook'
INTRODUCTION
W hen she was just twelve years old, the Somali Outlaws and the Somali
Mafia started sex trafficking Jane Doe Two (JD2).2 This continued,
intermittently, for four years. 3 When JD2 was sixteen, the federal
government initiated a prosecution against thirty Somali Outlaw and
Somali Mafia members for sex trafficking.4 The trial court severed the case
into six different trials.5 When JD2 was eighteen, the first of the six trials
i Assistant United States Attorney. B.A. Vassar College. J.D. University of Michigan
School of Law. The views expressed herein do not represent the views of the United States
Department of Justice or the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of
Tennessee. Some of the cases discussed within are cases I actually prosecuted. I would like
to thank Beverly Moran, Melynda Price, Darryl Stewart, and Juan Floyd-Thomas for their
helpful comments on previous drafts. I am extremely grateful to Mary Katherine Parrott ,
Molly Smith, and the other editors at the Kentucky Law Journal for their tremendous
dedication and hard work. All errors are, of course, my own. I am also grateful to the Honorable
Damon J. Keith, Judge for the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and long-time
advocate for justice. Thank you Judge for over a half-century of inspiration.
This article originally started as a motion to assert the victims' rights to finality in the
Somali Sex Trafficking Case. In that case, the district court severed the case into six different
trials, resulting in prolonged litigation. Having authored the brief in United States v. Young,
657 E 3 d 408 (6th Cir. 2011 ), I was very familiar with Speedy Trial jurisprudence, particularly
the viability of Barker v. Wingo to balance litigant interests and expeditious prosecutions.
During the course of researching the originally intended victims' motion, I realized that
the field was ripe for scholarship, as well as activism, involving points of compromise and
discourse between victims' rights and established jurisprudence. Specifically, established case
law involving speedy trials is well suited to also vindicate the interest of victims' in finality. I
invite readers to use this article as activism, meaning to challenge the denial of victims' rights
to finality in active litigation.
2 Third Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Adan, No: 3:10-00260 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 22, 2012), ECF No. 2701; Allie Shah, 3 Twin Cities Somalis Guilty of Sex Trafficking, STAR
TRIB., May 5, 2012, at iB.
3 Shah, supra note 2.
4 Indictment, Adan, No. 3:10-0026o (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 201o), ECF No. 3.
5 Motion for Severance, Adan, 3:10-0026o (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 8, 2012), ECF No. 1349;
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began.6 During trial, JD2 remained on the witness stand for an entire week.
As part of her extensive testimony, she provided details of being bought
and sold sexually within the Somali Outlaws and Somali Mafia and outside
for as little as $40 and for as many as twenty times in a single day.7 By the
time all of the trials are completed, and JD2 no longer has to testify, she
will have endured the agony of direct examination and cross examination
for months, retelling the sordid details of being sexually commodified. She
will also be in her mid-twenties and finished with college.
The Somali Sex Trafficking Case8 raises numerous questions about a
victim's right to finality, closure, and a speedy resolution. How long is too
long for victims, particularly victims of violent crimes and sexual abuse,
to wait before they receive closure? Does delay in criminal proceedings
result in material prejudice to victims? What does that prejudice look like?
What forms does it take? Should victims receive redress for delays? What
recourse do victims have with respect to their interests in finality? Can
victims assert an interest in a speedy disposition without upsetting the
defendant's constitutionally protected rights and the government's need
to vindicate the public? Do victims have equal standing with defendants?
Should they? Should defendants be allowed to delay the trial in an effort
to exhaust the victim?
After decades of being ignored, silenced, and marginalized, crime
victims politically mobilized and pressured Congress to pass the 2004
Crime Victims' Rights Act (the "CVRA"). 9 In order to comprehend the
CVRA, as well as its struggles, problems, and possible solutions, it is
imperative to contextualize the CVRA in its proper historical dimensions
and political context. It is, in fact, a political compromise between victims'
rights advocates and their opposition. It came of age during the civil rights
movement as well as its backlash." The CVRA, therefore, has an odd political
Order,Adan, No. 3:10-0026o (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2012), ECF No. 1395.
6 Kristen Hall, Somali Sex Trafficking Case Finishes With Split Verdict."3 Convicted, 6 Acquitted,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2ol2/o5/o5/
somali-sex-trafficking-case-n I483604.html.
7 Id
8 To be clear, reference to the "Somali Sex Trafficking Case" is purely descriptive. It
describes the ethnicity of the perpetrators as well as the victims and witnesses. In addition, it
references the case as it is publically recognized, including within the Somalian community.
9 Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims' Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102, 1 18 Stat. 2260, 2262 (2004) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (Supp. 2009)) [hereinafter CVRA].
1o The dual lineage of the Victim Rights Movement is discussed in more detail in Part
II.A, infra. In essence, the movement emerged from both the civil rights struggles aimed at
the socio-economically disenfranchised, who are also disproportionately affected by violence,
as well as a populist hegemony through "get tough" on crime measures. See Danielle Levine,
Comment, Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's Role in A System of Public
Prosecution, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 335, 341-46 (2010); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MAss INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 40-48 (2010).
[Vol. I01
STEPPING INTO THE GAP
lineage, backed by both conservatives interested in "get tough on crime"
agendas and grassroots organizations representing the socio-economically
disenfranchised, who are disproportionately victimized by violent crimes."
Blending these two threads together, the CVRA attempts to integrate
victims into the criminal justice process after public law principles have
excluded them for centuries.' Specifically, the CVRA provides violent
crime victims with eight enumerated rights, one of which is the right to
proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 3 Congress, however, did not
define this right. No court has defined the right. Consequently, a victim's
right to finality has remained dormant and unsubstantiated for nine years.
There are at least two reason that explain why victims lack meaningful
rights: (1) adherence to the public prosecution model and (2) our Anglo
American legal tradition fixated on defendants' rights. As for the public
prosecution model, victims are not parties to criminal proceedings. In
criminal proceedings there are only two litigants: defendants and the
government. 4 Crimes are transgression against the public, not violations
against individuals, therefore in criminal prosecutions, the government,
not the victim, vindicates the interest of the public.' By contrast, in civil
i i Levine, supra note 10, at 341 ("In response to the increased protections the accused
received, conservatives championed victims' rights in order to promote their 'tough on crime'
agenda and strengthen the hand of the prosecutor and police. The grassroots groups sought
to be a voice for victims who were often ignored or treated without sensitivity by prosecutors.
Although these groups had different motivations from the tough-on-crime conservatives, all
of the groups had the same end goal: victim advocacy.") (footnote omitted); Lynn D. Lu,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing: Some Views of Former U.S.
Attorneys, i9 FED. SENT'G REP. 192, 193 (i997).
i See 150 CONG. REC. SIo,91i (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(noting that the CVRA was designed to make crime victims "independent participants in
the proceedings"); 15o CONG. REC. S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (noting that the CVRA affords victims "the right to participate in the system").
13 I8 U.S.C. § 377i(a)(7) (2oo6).
14 Under the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors have near-absolute power
to determine whether to bring criminal charges, whether to pursue a prosecution, and how
to negotiate a plea bargain. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 7it (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the executive is responsible for prosecuting criminal offenses and
that the other branches have means to check that power: Congress through the impeachment
power and the courts by dismissing malicious prosecutions); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that
the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute,
and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.");
Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[Flederal
courts have traditionally and, to our knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the
instance of a private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to
prosecute persons regarding whom a complaint of criminal conduct is made."). Nothing in this
article should be read to disturb prosecutorial discretion.
15 As discussed throughout this article, victims' rights lie at the intersection of adversary
adjudication and third-party interests. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime
Victim s Expanding Role in A System of Public Prosecution:A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims'
2012-20131
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proceedings, individual citizens can seek vindication against the accused
through damages. Whereas the goal in criminal proceedings is to redress
deprivations of liberty, plaintiffs in the civil context seek the award of
monetary damages. It is the tort system, not criminal prosecutions, that
restore the victim to the status quo ante. Public, not private, law is the
model of American prosecutions.
As to the second reason for the dearth of victims' rights, the Anglo-
American legal tradition provides defendants distinct constitutional rights
to guard against government tyranny, including the right to a speedy trial
and to confront witnesses. 6 These rights are sometimes referred to as the
Rights Act, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 164, 164 (201 i) ("The American criminal justice
system is often envisioned as one in which public prosecutors pursue public prosecutions on
behalf of the public-leaving no room for crime victims' involvement.").
In essence, "[alt the time of the Constitution, there existed in England a longstanding
custom of private prosecution." Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,
816 n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). "[PIrivate prosecutions developed in England as a means
of facilitating private vengeance." John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality
of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 515 (1994). This reflected the idea that a crime was
an offense against the victim. However, "dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of a system
of private prosecution" led early colonial governments to reject this system in favor of one
"administered by impartial government officials rather than interested private parties."
Andrew Sidman, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REv. 754, 763-64
(1976); see also id. at 762-63 (noting that Virginia created the Office of the Attorney General
in 1643 and that Connecticut provided for a system of local public prosecutions in 1704).
This shift in favor of public prosecutions reflected a philosophical movement away from
the narrow conceptualization of criminal conduct as an offense against the victim towards
a broader view of criminal conduct as "an offense against the sovereignty." 21 Am. JuR. 2D
CriminalLaw § 1 (1998) (citation omitted). Under this view, a wrongdoer is prosecuted, not by
a private prosecutor working for the victim, but instead by a public official on behalf of (and
in the name of) the sovereign who represents the "the interest[s] of society as a whole." Ferri
v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202-203 (1979); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986)
("The criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the
benefit of society as a whole.").
The Framers followed the colonists' lead by placing the power to prosecute crimes in
the hands of disinterested public officials in the Executive Branch. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, §
3 (establishing the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"); United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,467 (1996) ("[O]ne of the core powers of the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government [is] the power to prosecute."). Consistent with the Framers' vision,
the first Congress provided for the appointment in each judicial district of "a meet person
learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States" and charged that person-the
United States Attorney-with enforcing the federal criminal laws. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92; see also z8 U.S.C. § 5I5(a) (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General and
his subordinates to conduct all litigation, "civil or criminal," on behalf of the United States);
28 U.S.C. § 547(0) (2oo6) (vesting United States Attorneys with the power to prosecute federal
crimes). By doing so, Congress lodged squarely within the Executive Branch "the sole power
to prosecute criminal cases in the federal courts." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986).
Accordingly, there is no history of "any private prosecution of federal crimes." Young, 481 U.S.
at 817 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16 Steven J. Twist summarizes these bedrocks of American jurisprudence as follows:
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"zone of protection." 7 The public law model and the zone of protection
endow both the prosecution and defendants with a near monopoly in
the courtroom, resulting in the exclusion of third party victims and their
reduction in the trial process to mere pieces of evidence or reporters of
crime."
This article attempts a discursive shift away from a defendant or
government centered ethos into an area of clear compromise, where the
rights of the defendant, victim, and state are recognized and balanced. It is
imperative to note that the CVRA does not place victims on equal footing
with defendants or the government. 9 Nor does the CVRA confer party
At the soul of America's justice system lie two "good and perfect things": (I)
the principle that the procedural and substantive rights of the accused must be
preserved and protected as a proper restraint on the state's power to infringe
individual rights to life and liberty: and (2) the practice of public prosecution,
based on the theory that when a crime occurs, while it surely involves harm to a
victim, it also represents an offense against the state, which tears at the fabric of
our peace and community and hence creates a harm that is greater than simply the
harm to the victim involved.
These two "good and perfect things" have served America well. The first
respects each individual as an end, as "created equal, [and] endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights [tol Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness." These protections of the accused include rights of habeas corpus, to
a speedy and public jury trial, to know the nature and cause of the accusation,
to confront adverse witnesses and have compulsory process; rights to counsel,
due process and equal protection; and rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures, double jeopardy, self incrimination, excessive bail or fines, cruel and
unusual punishment, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws. Overall, these rights
form a zone of protection around the law-abiding, as well as the lawless, and serve
to deter the abuses of government power with which the history of the world is
all too familiar.
Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims' Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect Things, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 369, 369-70 (1999) (citations omitted). Commentators have noted the irony,
however, that persons suspected of crime receive tremendous protections from governmental
abuses; whereas, the defendant's victims do not share those protections, at least not in the
courtroom. E.g., Judith Rowland, Illusions of Justice: Who Represents the Victim?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 177, I8o (1992) ("It is ironic that one suspected of a crime enjoys the right to
receive physical protection from the government, while the law-abiding citizen is not entitled
to such protection.").
17 Twist, supra note 16, at 370.
18 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 865 (2007); Rowland, supra note 16, at 178.
Professor Paul G. Cassell's work provides many of the ideological underpinning for this article.
Several of his articles are discussed throughout this piece, particularly his discussion of the
historical circumstances giving rise to the CVRA as discussed supra in Part II.
19 "A 'party' to litigation is 'one by or against whom a lawsuit is brought."' United
States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 2004)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34 (1982)
(defining a "party" as a person or entity "named as a party to an action and subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court"). The only parties to a federal criminal prosecution, therefore, are the
defendant (the person "against whom" charges are brought) and the government (the persons
"by whom" charges are brought). Crime victims do not fit either of these definitions: federal
criminal charges are not brought "against" crime victims, nor may such charges be brought
"by" crime victims for the simple reason that victims are not imbued with the "coercive power
of the state." Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988).
Moreover, § 3771 (d)(6) states that "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the
2012-2013]
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status on victims.2 0 Rather, Congress endowed victims with eight specific
rights, one of which is the right to closure; however, that right is not clearly
defined. This article attempts to address this failure by establishing a
framework for a victim's right to a reasonable amount of closure.
Some critics argue that Congress deliberately left the victim's right
to finality undefined because it was reluctant to abandon the public
prosecution model."1 However, both the legislative history of the CVRA
and its plain language cut against this claim. Although Congress did not
abandon the public prosecution model, it did not create a meaningless
CVRA. The CVRA's sponsors understood that the CVRA required
additional clarification in order to illuminate its scope and meaning.2 The
sponsors, therefore, understood that the CVRA would evolve over time. In
addition, the CVRA provides a clear enforcement mechanism for its eight
enumerated rights, specifically a writ of mandamus.2 3 Far from being an
empty vehicle of political compromise, the CVRA is intended, among other
things, to provide victims with standing to challenge unreasonable delay.2 4
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C.
§3 7 7 1(d)(6) (2oo6). Far from sparking terror in the hearts of prosecutors, the CVRA clearly
protects against an infringement on prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Hunter, 548
F3d 13o8, 1316( oth Cir. 2008) (relying on § 377 i(d)(6) to hold that the CVRA does not usurp
prosecutorial discretion); 16CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3936.3 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing Hunter); Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims'Rights in an Adversary
System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 25 9 -
6o (2009) (arguing that although the CVRA accommodates
the interests of victims, it "reaffirm[s] prosecutorial discretion," and thereby reflects
"Congress['s] ... preference that the executive, not victims, prosecute criminal cases");
see also Steven J. Twist & Daniel Seiden, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment: A Brief
PointlCounterpoint, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 341, 365 (2012) (outlining the National District
Attorneys Association and Attorneys General of forty-eight states support for victims' rights
constitutional amendment).
20 See Hunter, 548 E3d. at 1311 (finding parents to a gun shooting victim, which resulted
from defendant's sale of a firearm to a minor, were not parties to the proceedings and did not
have a tangible interest in the outcome); see also Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal., 435 F3d lOl I, IO6 (9 th Cir. 2006).
21 See Blondel,supra note 19, at 260; see also Cassell & Joffee, supra note 15,at 167-68.
22 See Andrew Atkins, Note, A Complicated Environment: The Problem with Extending
Victims' Rights to Victims of Environmental Crimes, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1623, 1636 & n.83
(zo10) (citing 150 CONG. REC. $426o-o i, S4271-72 (2004) (statements of Sen. Patrick Leahy)).
23 Congress articulated the CVRA's enforcement mechanism through mandamus relief
as follows:
If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of
appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the
order of a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The court ofappeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith
within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be
stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing
this chapter. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the
denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.
i8 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006).
24 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7). See discussion infra Part IV.
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In addition to Congress's clear pronouncements, the Supreme Court has
suggested that a victim's right to finality exists separate and apart from that
of the defendant. 5
Several victims' rights advocates argue that all of the attempts to
vest victims with statutory rights have failed.2 6 Sex trafficking cases,
in particular, bring the inequalities between defendants and victims
into sharp relief.22 Without constitutionally recognized victims' rights,
25 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1972). In Barker, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that:
[T]here is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from,
and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused. The inability of courts
to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts,
which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for
pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition,
persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an opportunity
to commit other crimes. It must be of little comfort to the residents of Christian
County, Kentucky, to know that Barker was at large on bail for over four years
while accused of a vicious and brutal murder of which he was ultimately convicted.
Moreover, the longer an accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes
his opportunity to jump bail and escape. Finally, delay between arrest and
punishment may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26 Paul G. Cassell, The Victims' Rights Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-by-Clause Analysis,
5 PHOENIX L. REV. 301 (2012) [hereinafter Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment].
27 Sex trafficking victims are rarely persons of means. Furthermore, victims do not have
the right to counsel. For victims, this combination of disadvantages creates a formula for
vulnerability throughout the criminal justice process, as well as an opening for a second wave of
traumatization. See generally George K. Goodhue, Comment, Maryland v. Craig: Balancing Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Rights with the Rights of Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Trials, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 497,498 (2001) ("An extensive body of professional research clearly demonstrates
that many victimized children, when forced to testify in open court in the presence of the
accused, suffer a second victimization and traumatization."); Lynette M. Parker, Increasing
Law Students' Effectiveness When Representing Traumatized Clients: A Case Study of the Katharine
& George Alexander Community Law Center, 2 1 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 163, 176 (2007) ("Researchers
and scholars have noted that for many traumatized clients litigation and the legal process
can result in re-traumatization."). See also Roger K. Pitman et al., Legal Issues in Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, in 'TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND,
BoDY, AND SOCIETY 378,378-97 (B.A. van der Kolk ed. 1996); James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise
of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1205, 1274 (2004) (noting that
the effect of the legal process on sexual assault victims "has been referred to as the 'second
injury' or 'second wound"'); Edward J. Hickling et al., The Psychological Impact of Litigation:
Compensation Neurosis, Malingering, PTSD, Secondary Traumatization, and Other Lessons from
MIVAS, 55 DEPAtIL L. REV. 617, 630 (zoo6) (citations omitted); Jennifer L. Wright, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in an Interprofessional Practice at the University of St. Thomas Interprofessional Center
for Counseling and Legal Services, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 509, 509 n. I1 (2005) ("The risk of re-
traumatization of clients who have to repeat and relive their experiences of abuse, first in the
lawyer's office and then in court, is serious.").
However, as Parker points out, if the legal process is handled correctly, it may be
therapeutic. As an example, Parker cites Yael Danieli discussing the importance of "public
witnessing and giving testimony," as well as a "judgment by the court" acknowledging the
harm done to the survivor, and the "generat[ion] of records" documenting the harm committed
against the survivor. Yael Danieli, Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and Their Legaty: The Role of
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
these advocates argue, there will never be equality between victims and
defendants in the courtroom. Consequently, a constitutional amendment
is fundamentally necessary to endow victims with any meaningful rights.2 8
Indeed, it is difficult to equate rights that stem from the Constitution, as
is the case for defendants, with rights that are derived from statutes, as is
currently the case with victims. Unfortunately for victims' rights advocates,
an amendment to the Constitution requires, among other things, a two-
thirds majority in both the House and Senate. 9 This presents a near
insurmountable hurdle and explains decades of failed efforts to amend the
Constitution.3" Nothing in this article should be read to supplant any effort
to amend the Constitution to include a victim's bill of rights. Rather, this
article offers a stopgap measure that uses existing case law in order to give
the CVRA both meaning and traction.
In order to provide more traction to CVRA-recognized victims' rights,
courts can apply existing speedy trial analysis to a victim's right to finality
in order to give that right meaning, while simultaneously balancing the
interests of the defendant, the victim, and the government.3 Specifically,
courts can apply the four-prong Barkerv. Wingo test to determine whether
a victim's right to finality has been violated.3" The beauty of this process is
that the test has already balanced judicial efficiency and economy against
defendants' rights and prosecutorial discretion. Barker accomplishes this
balance by asking four questions: (1) did the litigant assert the right; (2) was
there delay; (3) who caused the delay; and (4) was the litigant prejudiced?
33
Each question demonstrates the flexibility of the test to accommodate
varying circumstances and interests. Properly applied, the Barker test can
be used to protect the legitimate rights of prosecutors and defendants,
while recognizing equally powerful victims' interests.
By engaging in the Barker analysis, courts can harmonize the interests
of crime victims with the constitutional rights of the accused, as well as the
discretionary needs of prosecutors. In order to make the most compelling
argument for grafting Barker onto the victim's right to finality, this article
does several things. First, Part I traces the history of the speedy trial
doctrine in order to set the historical and legal context for superimposing
Barker onto the victim's right to finality. Part II chronicles the history of the
crime victims' rights movement in order to contextualize the CVRA within
its political origins and, thereby, explain its weaknesses. Part III analyzes
the CVRA itself in order to explicate Congress's clear intention to give
Victims in International Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1633, 1640 (zoo6).
28 Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 302.
29 U.S. CONST. art. V.
30 See generally Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26.
31 Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 327-28.
32 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 327-28.
33 Id.
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victims standing to challenge unreasonable delays in criminal proceedings.
Part IV attempts to harmonize victims' right to finality with speedy trial
jurisprudence in order to give that right meaning while balancing the
interests of all litigants.
I. SPEEDY TRIAL JURISPRUDENCE
Different historical circumstances and political concerns created the
defendant's right to a speedy trial, as opposed to the victim's right to finality.
Victims' rights critics and skeptics draw from these differences to subjugate
victims' rights to those of defendants, some even urging the eradication of
victims' rights entirely. The defendant's right to a speedy trial and ability
to control the criminal prosecution clock springs from centuries of Anglo-
American law that rightfully fixated on protecting individual liberties from
government tyranny. To that end, two sources guarantee a defendant's right
to a speedy trial: the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act (SPA).
34
Both of these measures prevent defendants from languishing in prison and
allowing delays to erode their defense.
By contrast, the defendant's victims do not share constitutional
protections and centuries of time-honored analysis to support their rights.
Congress created the victim's right to finality in 2004, as discussed in Part
III. Relative to the defendant's right to a speedy trial, the victim's right
to finality is historically weaker and relatively embryonic. The defendant,
not the victim or the government, exercises tremendous control over the
criminal prosecution clock.35 In some cases, defendants can manipulate the
clock in order to exhaust the patience and resolve of the victim to testify.
This ability to manipulate the prosecution clock is exactly why victims
should have the ability to seek redress from unreasonable delay.
Congress, through the CVRA, has endowed victims with the ability
to challenge unreasonable delay in court proceedings. In speedy trial
jurisprudence, courts have already fashioned balancing tests to ensure
judicial efficiency and economy, while balancing the interests of all litigants.
Courts can, and should, extend those same balancing tests to protect the
victim's right to finality. Centuries of jurisprudence have defined the limits
and scope of judicial efficiency within the confines of the litigants' rights.
A victim's interest in closure is one more factor that ought to be weighed
meaningfully in the balance.
34 i8 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
35 See generally Steven I. Twist, The Crime Victims' Rights Amendment and Two Good and
Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 369 (1999).
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A. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
1. History.-The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
a right to a speedy trial. 36 Centuries of jurisprudence have defined the
contours and limitations of this right.37 Anglo-American law first articulated
the right in the 1215 Magna Carta: "We will sell to no man, we will not
deny or defer to any man either justice or right."38 Five centuries later, Sir
Edward Coke noted that England sought to ensure that prisoners would
not "be long detained, but at their next coming have given the prisoner full
and speedy justice. '39 Early colonial constitutions also noted the right to
a speedy trial.40 In 1791, Congress ratified the Sixth Amendment, and the
right to a speedy trial became a safeguard against government discretion
and consequent tyranny.41
2. Founder's Intent.-The Framers had two purposes behind the Sixth
Amendment Speedy Trial Clause: (1) to prevent defendants from
languishing in jail during pretrial detention, and (2) to ensure a defendant's
right to a fair trial.42 Pretrial incarceration can have detrimental effects on a
defendant, including heightened public scrutiny, employment termination,
strained family relationships, and anxieties related to imprisonment.43
Trial delay can also lead to unavailable witnesses, faded memories, lost or
destroyed evidence, and a defendant's dwindling resolve to withstand a
plea offer.' Although these dangers threaten the victim, prosecution, and
the defense, only the defendant's life, liberty, and property are at stake in a
criminal proceeding." These distinctions are often used to reject equalizing
the playing field between the defendant and victim in the courtroom;
however, rules designed to effectuate judicial economy and efficiency can
also balance the sometimes competing interests of the victim, the state, the
government, and the defendant, as argued in Part IV.
36 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225-26 (1967).
37 See, e.g., Patrick Ellard, Note, Learning from Katrina: Emphasizing the Right to A Speedy
Tnialto Protect Constitutional Guarantees in Disasters, 44AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1207, 1209-10 (2007).
38 Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223-26 (documenting long history of Sixth Amendment Speedy
Trial Right); see also United States v. Provoo, 17 ER.D. 183, 196 (D. Md. 1955). This phrase
illuminates the idea that the sovereign cannot "defer" or postpone a trial for the accused.
39 Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 224 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (London, 5th ed. 1797)).
40 Id. at 225 (noting the inclusion of a speedy trial provision in the early colonial bill of
rights and the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776).
41 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see also Ellard, supra note 37, at 12 10.
42 See United States v. Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115, 1 19 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
43 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
44 Id. at 532.
45 Id. at 527.
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3. Application andScope.-The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial "is
activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to
those persons who have been 'accused' in the course of that prosecution."'
A prosecution begins, for speedy trial purposes, at the point of an
indictment, information, or arrest, whichever occurs first.47 The defendant's
right is satisfied at the beginning of trial or voir dire.48
46 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). A defendant's rights under the
Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment are triggered by "either a formal indictment or
information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal
charge." Id. at 320 (stating any delay before this time must be scrutinized under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause).
47 Id. at 320. In United States v. Marion, Justice Douglas disagreed, arguing that the "right
to a speedy trial is the right to be brought to trial speedily which would seem to be as relevant
to pretrial indictment delays as it is to post-indictment delays." Id. at 328 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). In United States v. MacDonald, the Court granted certiorari on the following issues:
[W]hether the time between dismissal of military charges and a subsequent
indictment on civilian criminal charges should be considered in determining
whether the delay in bringing respondent to trial for the murder of his wife
and two children violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. I, 3 (1982). In MacDonald, the Court did not find a
speedy trial violation where, in May of 1970, the government proceeded with a murder charge
against the defendant under military law but dismissed the charge in October of that year. Id.
at 4-6. The defendant was discharged in December. In June 1972, the government reopened
the investigation, but a grand jury was not convened until August of 1974. The defendant
was not indicted until January 1975. The Supreme Court found that the period between
dismissal of the first charge and the later indictment had none of the characteristics that called
for application of the speedy trial clause. Id. at io. Nevertheless, the period between arrest
and indictment must be considered in evaluating a speedy trial claim. Id. Both Marion and
MacDonald were applied in United States v. Loud Hawk, holding the speedy trial guarantee
inapplicable to the period during which the government appealed dismissal of an indictment,
since during that time the suspect had not been subject to bail or otherwise restrained. United
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,311-12 (1986).
Significantly, the Court has found that the speedy trial right attaches where an interest it
seeks to protect is threatened. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. For example, the concerns of the speedy
trial right are pretrial incarceration, heightened public scrutiny, employment termination,
strained family relationships, and anxieties related to imprisonment. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320.
As a result, the Court has found that the right attaches at the moment a formal prosecution
begins or an actual arrest is made, not at the point of investigation. Id. Similarly, as argued in
Part III, when the right to finality is applied to the victim, it should attach when the victim's
interest are jeopardized.
48 See United States v. Young, 657 E3d 408, 416 (6th Cir. 20 11) ("[Fjor purposes of the
Speedy Trial Act, trial begins with voirdire."). It should also be noted that for purposes of the
Speedy Trial Act:
[A] district court may not attempt to evade the spirit of the Act by conducting
voir dire within the statutory time limits and then ordering a prolonged recess
with an intent to pay mere 'lip service' to the Act's requirements. Arguably, in the
constitutional context, if the beginning of voirdirwere a pretense, a constitutional
speedy-trial claim might be preserved.
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4. When is the Right Denied?-Unlike the Speedy Trial Act (SPA),49 the
Supreme Court refused to set a specific number of days for a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial violation. 0 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]
he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative."'" Thus, each prosecution
requires careful balancing between the desire to prevent unreasonable
delay and the time necessary for litigation. In order to accommodate the
competing interests involved in litigation, the Court developed an ad hoc
balancing test that addresses the following four factors: (1) length of delay,
(2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertions of his right, and
(4) prejudice to the defendant.12 None of these factors is "a necessary or a
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
trial," but the factors are related and "must be considered together with
such other circumstances as may be relevant ... in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process."53
a. Length of Delay
The first Barker factor-the length of the delay-serves as a threshold
or "triggering mechanism" for speedy-trial analysis. 4 A delay of at least one
year in bringing a defendant to trial will trigger a rebuttable presumption of
violation, with the level of judicial scrutiny increasing in direct proportion
to the length of delay.5" Depending on the circumstances of each individual
case, a longer delay may be constitutional and a shorter delay may be
unconstitutional.
Id. at 416-17 (quoting United States v. Scaife, 749 F2d 338, 343 (6th Cir.1984)).
49 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2oo6 & Supp. 2011 ).
50 Barker, 407 U.S. at 521.
51 Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905). "Whether delay in completing a
prosecution ... amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the
circumstances." Pollard v\ United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). This conception of the
rights as a relative one flows from our recognition of the fact that "the ordinary procedures for
criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace." United States v. Ewell, 383
U.S. 116,120 (1966).
52 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. For the federal courts, Congress under the Speedy Trial Act
of 1974 imposed strict time deadlines, replacing the Barker factors. See discussion infra Part
l.B. However, in the federal courts, a defendant can bring a speedy trial claim under the
Constitution or the Act.
53 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
54 Id. at 530.
55 See Dodgettv. UnitedStates, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (considering the notion of "presumptive
prejudice"). Other courts have generally found presumptive prejudice where the delay is
more than a year. See, e.g., Amos v. Thornton, 646 F 3d 199, 2o6 (5 th Cir. 2011 ).
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b. Reason for Delay
The second Barker factor is the reason for the delay. Courts will
allow for delays attributable to legitimate reasons, for example the filing
and deciding of motions, 6 interlocutory appeals, 7 defendant's need
for additional time to build a viable defense, and the scheduling of key
witnesses. Delays attributable to illegitimate reasons may, however, prove
fatal to the prosecution. For example, the government's deliberate attempt
to delay proceedings and obstruct the defense, as well as negligently
misplacing a defendant's file or losing evidence may result in dismissal.
Courts have also imposed an active duty on the trial court and the
prosecution to act expeditiously. In Barker, the Supreme Court noted,
"The government, and for that matter, the trial court are not without
responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases."5 " The Court went
on to emphasize that the primary burden to bring a case to trial rests with
the prosecution and the courts.5 9 In Vermontv. Brillon,6 ° the Supreme Court
stated that "institutional problems" and other "[d]elay resulting from a
systemic breakdown ... could be charged to the State."'" It is important to
note the Court's warning to both the government and lower courts to try
cases expeditiously because the same admonishment should apply equally
to victims' claims of unreasonable delay.
As examples of impermissible delay resulting from systemic breakdowns,
two cases from the Sixth Circuit are worth noting: United States v. Graham,62
56 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 657 F 3 d 408, 415 (6th Cit. aoII), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1647 (2012). In Young, the court found that the case had "generated 3,628 docket entries
related to 'complex motions'-many of them filed by Young." Id. The Sixth Circuit noted,
"[w]hen a party makes motions, it cannot use the delay caused by those motions as a basis for
a speedy-trial claim." Id.
57 United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1986). Under LoudHawk, a party
having sought the aid of judicial process cannot, in general, complain about the length of the
process. Id. at 316-17. The Loud Hawk court found that a delay resulting from an interlocutory
appeal would weigh against the government if the appeal were "clearly tangential or frivolous,"
but a "reversal[] by the Court of Appeals [is] prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the
Government's action." Id. at 315-16.
58 Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 n.27 (quoting Hodges v. United States, 408 E2d 543, 551 (8th
Cir. 1969)).
59 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.
60 Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283 (2009).
6I Id. at 1292-93.
62 United States v. Graham, 128 E 3 d 372 (6th Cit. 1997). Defense advocates have
remarked that courts rarely find a speedy trial violation because (i) trial courts are allowed to
bury any period of delay in an "interest of justice" rubric and (2) dismissal with prejudice is a
very drastic remedy. See, e.g., Ellard, supra note 37, at 1216. In Graham, Judge Keith explained
the harsh consequences for dismissal with prejudice as follows:
It is because the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy prosecution is so
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and Maples v. Stegall.63 Again, it is important to note the Court's stance toward
systemic breakdowns because the Court's admonishment should apply
equally to victims' claims of unreasonable delay. In United States v. Graham,
the Sixth Circuit found a speedy trial violation where a district court took
eight years to resolve a discovery dispute and failed to appoint counsel for
a co-defendant for over a year. In those circumstances, according to the
court, "much of the blame for the delay... [fell] on the government and
on the district court."6 Similarly, in Maples, the Sixth Circuit found another
speedy trial violation when a state court took an unreasonably long time
to adjudicate an entrapment motion, in part because of a co-defendant's
delay. The court found that the trial court "should have been vigilant about
the co-defendant's dilatory filing" 6 and that the trial court "'failed to assert
itself in an attempt to move the process along." ' 66
c. Defendant's Assertion of the Right
The third Barker factor asks whether the defendant asserted a right to
a speedy trial. In Barker, the Supreme Court emphasized that the "failure
to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he
was denied a speedy trial. ' 67 In general, defendants must assert their Sixth
Amendment right by filing a timely motion before the trial court. If the
defendant fails to assert the right or acquiesces in the face of protracted
pretrial delays, he may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal,
unless the defendant's failure to raise the issue earlier was due to her or his
attorney's negligence. 68 Defendants who delay prosecution by inundating
the trial court with frivolous pretrial motions are also treated as having
forfeited their right to a speedy trial. The law does not allow defendants to
profit from their own wrong under these circumstances. 69 The defendant's
fundamental to our justice system, yet so difficult to define in a concrete manner,
that it is incumbent upon our Court to zealously defend it. It is only by forcefully
admonishing those that flout this right that the Court can define boundaries to
guide litigants and courts, and prevent abuses of the right such as the case before
us. Here, the delay was eight times that necessary to trigger judicial review, and
the presumption of prejudice is undiluted by dilatory tactics on the part of the
defense. Thus, the defendants are entitled to relief.
Graham, 1z8 E3d at 376.
63 Maples v. Stegall, 427 F-3d 1020 (6th Cir. 2005).
64 Graham, 128 E3d at 375.
65 Maples, 427 E3d at 1028.
66 Id. (quoting Graham, 128 F3d at 373).
67 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 657 F3d 408, 415 (6th Cit. 2011 ), cert. denied, 132
S.Ct. 1647 (2012) (finding defendant's aggressive motions practice, filing of continuances and
acquiescing to the continuance motions of his co-conspirators, and failing to assert his right
for seven years indicated an unwillingness to be tried speedily).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Auerbach, 42o F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cit. 1969) ("Having sought
the aid of the judicial process and realizing the deliberateness that a court employs in
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acquiescence in delay when it works to his advantage should be considered
against his later assertion that he was denied the guarantee, and the
defendant's responsibility for the delay is conclusive.
It is also important to note that when a court analyzes whether the
defendant asserted a right to a speedy trial, the court will evaluate the
defendant's assertion within the context of his other actions. In United States
v. Young" for example, where the Sixth Circuit evaluated a delay just short
of eleven years, the court found that the defendant's behavior undermined
his speedy trial claim. Young repeatedly asked for and joined continuances;
he never filed a motion for an immediate trial; he did not assert his right to
a speedy trial in letters he wrote to the court; and he filed his first motion
to dismiss while the district court lacked jurisdiction because of the first
interlocutory appeal.7
d. Prejudice
The final Barker element is prejudice to the defendant. The prejudice
inquiry protects three interests: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize the anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired."72 Of
these, "the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."73
Courts will find any delay, including those that are shorter than a year,
unconstitutional where the delay severely limited the accused's ability to
defend. For example, courts find the death of an alibi witness, who would
have been available for a timely trial, prima facie proof of prejudice.74
In United States v. Loud Hawk, the Supreme Court found that a ninety
month delay, caused by an interlocutory appeal, did not weigh against the
government and the possibility of consequent prejudice to defendant did
reaching a decision, the defendants are not now able to criticize the very process which they
so frequently called upon.").
70 Young, 657 E3d at 414.
71 Id. at 415. It should be noted, however, that because victims are unrepresented parties
and do not have counsel, their failure to assert a right to finality should not constitute waiver.
See discussion infra Part IV.3.
72 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
73 Id. However, "[wlhen the government prosecutes a case with reasonable diligence, a
defendant who cannot demonstrate how his defense was prejudiced with specificity will not
make out a speedy trial claim no matter how great the ensuing delay." Young, 657 E3d at 418
(quoting United States v. Howard, 218 E3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2000)). The Sixth Circuit has
also held that specific prejudice must be "substantial prejudice" for a defendant to prevail on
a speedy-trial claim. United States v. White, 985 E2d 271, 276 (6th Cir. 1993).
74 In Barker the Supreme Court noted "[i]fwitnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
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not trigger a violation. 5 Moreover, the courts of appeals routinely reject
Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges in the absence of a showing
of prejudice.16 However, in Doggett v. United States," the Supreme Court
held that an "extraordinary" eight-and-one-half-year delay between
the defendant's indictment and arrest resulted from the government's
"egregious persistence in failing to prosecute" the defendant."8 As a result,
according to the Court, the government violated the defendant's right to
a speedy trial even in the absence of "affirmative proof of particularized
prejudice."' 9
5. Criticism of the Speedy Trial Right.-Although the Barker v. Wingo test
guards against gross prosecutorial delay and systemic breakdowns in court
systems, many defense attorneys argue that courts rarely find a speedy
trial violation."0 For instance, in Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court held
that despite a five year delay between indictment and trial, there was no
violation .' Critics advance two reasons for the Court's reluctance. First,
although framed as a defendant's right, it is in fact defense lawyers who have
the greatest incentive to delay a trial. Second, the Court has encouraged
legislatures as well as courts through their rule-making powers to address
the problems of delay by adopting their own rules for reducing delay.8"
Still, the constitutional right to a speedy trial serves to protect against
75 United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 317 (1986).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 63 E3d 1478, 1497 (9 th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Tannehill, 49 F3 d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 1995).
77 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
78 Id. at 657.
79 Id. at 652, 655, 657.
8o This is particularly true in cases where defendants cannot demonstrate actual
prejudice and where defendants were not detained pretrial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
498 F 3d 523, 532 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no speedy trial violation because defendant failed
to show ten month delay caused actual prejudice because defendant would have been
incarcerated anyway); United States v. Frye, 489 E3d 201, 2 12-13 (5 th Cir. 2007) (finding no
speedy trial violation because no witnesses were made unavailable and defendant suffered no
actual prejudice); United States v. White, 443 E3 d 582, 591 (7th Cir. 2oo6) (finding no speedy
trial violation because defendant failed to show nine month delay caused actual prejudice);
United States v. Casas, 425 F3d 23, 35 (ist Cir. 2005) (finding no speedy trial violation because
defendants failed to show forty-one month delay caused actual prejudice); United States v.
Dent, 149 F3d 18o, I85 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding no speedy trial violation because defendant
failed to show five year delay caused actual prejudice because defendant did not diligently
seek allegedly lost witnesses and dimmed memory helped his defense); United States v.
Jones, 129 E3d 718, 724 (2d Cit. 1997) (finding no speedy trial violation because defendant
failed to show thirty day delay caused actual prejudice). But see, e.g., United States v. Ingram,
446 F3 d 1332, 1336 (ith Cir. 2oo6) (finding speedy trial violation when first three Barker
factors weighted heavily against government, eliminating need to show actual prejudice).
81 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534 (1972).
82 Id. at 523 ("The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent
with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise.").
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government excess, whether in the form of prosecutorial misconduct, court
inefficiency, or government negligence."3
B. The Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (SPA) specifically implements a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 84 Congress had three
concerns in enacting the SPA: (1) the rising crime rate in the 1960s,85 (2)
the increasing backlog of cases in the federal courts, and (3) the increase in
the number of defendants who were jumping bail during extended pretrial
release.86 In order to address these concerns, the SPA sets a specific number
of days within which a defendant must be arraigned 7 and brought to trial. 8
The information or indictment must be filed within thirty days from the
date of arrest or service of the summons.89 Voir dire must begin within
seventy days from the date of the information or indictment, or from the
defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later.90 The sanction for SPA
violations is dismissal with or without prejudice to reprosecution.
91
83 For example, in Doggett v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether the
government violated the defendant's speedy trial right during an eight and one-half year
delay between the defendant's indictment and arrest. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 650. The Court
found that the government negligently pursued the defendant by failing to question whether
the defendant remained in hiding abroad. Id. at 652-53. The Court held that the government
violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial because the delay had presumptively prejudiced
the defendant's ability to prepare an adequate defense. Id. at 658.
84 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2oo6 & Supp. 2oii).
85 See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at I I (1980).
86 See 17 Cong. Rec. 3405-o6 (197 ) (remarks of Sen. Ervin, sponsor of S. 895, 92d Cong.
(1971) an early version of the SPA).
87 18 U.S.C. § 316i(b) (2oo8) ("Any information or indictment charging an individual
with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which
such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.").
88 Id. § 3161(c)(i) ("In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a
defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall
commence within seventy days from the filing date... of the information or indictment.
89 Id. § 3161(b).
9o Id. § 3161(c)(i). In cases involving more than one defendant, the speedy trial clock
starts to run on the date of the indictment common to each defendant. See United States v.
Smith, No. 11-5520, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2013).
91 When determining prejudice, the court must consider the seriousness of the offense,
the circumstances leading to dismissal, and the impact that reprosecution would have on the
administration justice and of the SPA. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(i)-(a)(2) (2oo6 & Supp. 201 ). In
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a trial court must
examine each statutory factor in deciding to dismiss charges with prejudice. Id. at 336-37.
The Court in Taylorfound that a minor violation of the time limitations of the Act that did not
prejudice the defendant's trial preparation did not justify the dismissal with prejudice of an
indictment charging serious drug offenses. Id. at 343. Obviously, dismissal of an action is not a
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Because the courts recognize the complexity of criminal proceedings,
several periods of delay are legitimately subtracted from the speedy trial
clock, for example the time it takes to file and decide motions, a defendant's
right to continue trial in order to prepare a viable defense, and the time
for interlocutory appeals.9" Each of these periods of time would remain
legitimate reasons for delay when grafting Barker onto a victim's right to
finality, as argued in Part IV.
The SPA is an example of both Congress and the courts adopting rules
to ameliorate the increasing complexities of case backlog and judicial
economy, while balancing the legitimate interests of the defendant, trial
court, appellate court, and the government. Although the SPA has been
moderately successful at reducing the time from criminal arrest to trial,
there remains significant delay in criminal cases. Furthermore, with the
advent of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) 93 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE),94 federal
prosecutions are growing increasingly more complex and lengthy.95 The
following tables provide some indication of delay based on the number of
pending cases in the federal courts:
proper sanction for victims as discussed in Part IV.B, which explores appropriate sanctions for
victims denied a right to finality.
92 Certain pretrial delays are automatically excluded from the SPA's time limits, such
as delays caused by pretrial motions. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (2oo6 & Supp. 2011). In
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986), the Supreme Court held that § 361 (h)(1)
(D), which at the time was § 3161(h)()(F), excludes "all time between the filing of a motion
and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that
hearing is 'reasonably necessary."' Id. at 330. The Act also excludes a reasonable period (up
to thirty days) during which a motion is actually "under advisement" by the court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(I)(H). Other delays excluded from the Act's time limits include delays caused by
the unavailabiliry of the defendant or an essential witness, Id. § 3 161 (h)(3); delays attributable
to a co-defendant, Id. § 3161(h)(6); and delays attributable to the defendant's involvement
in other proceedings, including delays resulting from an interlocutory appeal. Id. § 3161(h)
(i)(B)-(C). Note, however, that the thirty--day defense preparation period provided for in
Section 3161(c)(2) is calculated without reference to the Section 3161(h) exclusions.
In addition, a period of delay to allow the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct and
a "period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential
witness" are excluded. Id. § 3161(h)( 3 )(A). Furthermore, delay because a continuance is
granted by a judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or government is
also excluded. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In order to respect the legitimate interests of both the
defendant and the government, all of these exclusions should also apply to victims' claims of
unreasonable delay.
93 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (zoo6 & Supp. 2011).
94 21 U.S.C. § 848 (zoo6).
95 KENNETH CARLSON & PETER FINN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTING
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES: FEDERAL OFFENSE AND OFFENDERS 2 (1993), available at http://bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pce.pdf ("Whether disposed by plea or trial, CCE cases took considerably
longer to resolve than other drug trafficking cases. Racketeering cases took somewhat longer
to dispose than cases that involved the corresponding underlying offenses, and approximately
50% longer than the average for all offenses").
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Table 1
Judicial Caseload Indicators
12-Month Periods Ending March 3196
% Change % Change % Change
Judicial Caseload 2002 2007 2010 2011 Since 2002 Since 2007 Since 2010
U.S. Courts of Appeals
Cases Filed 56,534 60,668 56,790 55,753 -1.4 -8.1 -1.8
CasesTerminated 57.607 65,308 60,316 58-349 1.3 -10.7 -3.3
Cases Pending 39,242 53,085 47,036 44,440 13.2 -16.3 -55
U.S. District Courts
Criminal (IncludesTrarsfers)
Defendants Filed 84389 87,479 98,798 103,638 22.8 18.5 4.9
DefendantsTerminated 77,988 90.043 98,062 99,131 27.1 10.1 1.1
Defendents Pending 73,277 98,320 106,249 110,756 51.1 12.6 4.2
Table 2
As an example of extensive delay, the pending cases in Arizona are
particularly interesting to note 97 :
Change In judicial caseloads, 2010 to 2011
45 M Ana na
38.15% 0 Nation
30
24.81%
3.88%
1,59% 2.13%
-3.95%
.15
COinal case fiings Weighted filings per Total e0 filinps Pending cases
judgeship
In many prosecutions, the defendant is the only litigant disinterested
in a speedy resolution because delay can favor the defendant.98 The
96 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
MARCH 31, 2011 6 (201 1), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/
Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2o1 i/front/IndicatorsMar I .pdf.
97 Victoria Pelham, A Year into Emergency, Arizona Federal Courts Still Face "Dire"
Situation, CRONKITE NEWS, Mar. 14, 2012, http://cronkitenewsonline.com/2o12/03/a-year-
into-emergency-arizona-federal-courts-still-face-dire-situation/
98 The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that "efforts by defendants to
unreasonably delay proceedings are frequently granted, even in the face of State constitutional
amendments and statutes requiring otherwise." Twist, supra note 16, at 377 (citing S. Rep. No.
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prosecution's witnesses may lose their resolve to testify or otherwise
become unavailable; their memories may fade; corroborating evidence may
be lost; the case may grow stale and receive less priority; frequent personnel
changes in the prosecutor's office may mean that the office must re-staff
a lingering case, requiring each new prosecutor to learn the case from the
beginning; with frequent changes in personnel, mistakes can happen, such
as the loss of evidence or the mishandling of exculpatory materials; the
patience of victims may be frustrated and dwindle; defendant's aggressive
motions practice may consume the government's resources; and the
government may broker more generous plea offers in order to combat the
damage caused by all of these things. Given these advantages, particularly
where the court does not detain the defendant, defendants may sometimes
have little, if any interest, in seeking a speedy resolution.
II. THE POLITICIZATION OF CRIME AND THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
As noted in Part I, the Sixth Amendment, the Speedy Trial Act (SPA),99
and centuries of jurisprudence provide defendants with considerable
control over the speedy trial clock. The defendant's speedy trial right is
a part of a matrix of substantive and procedural rights that guard against
government excess.1"' Victims, by contrast, do not have constitutional
rights. In fact, victims are not parties to the criminal proceeding at all. As
such, the Constitution does not articulate rights for victims. Victims lack
constitutional legitimacy, including the right to counsel, which would
safeguard their ability to vindicate their interests. Sex trafficking and
other cases involving socio-economically disadvantaged victims highlight
the power imbalance between victims and defendants in the courtroom.
This is particularly problematic because the criminal proceeding itself
presents another opportunity to re-victimize the victim or to subject the
victim to a second wave of trauma. This trauma may include prolonged
proceedings that eviscerate a victim's ability to put the incident behind
her; violations of privacy rights; and anxiety from unresolved prosecutions
and anticipated testimony. Lacking any representation in the courtroom,
victims are vulnerable to the defendant, the prosecution, and the courts.
To date, recent statutes and political compromise have created embryonic
victims' rights. 10 1 Consequently, defendants and victims do not share equal
footing. Currently, the Constitution makes defendants more powerful than
their victims within the criminal justice process. Without constitutional
legitimacy, victims' rights will remain subordinate to those of defendants'.W
105-409, at 19 (1998)).
99 18 U.S.C.§ 3161 (2oo6 & Supp. 201 I).
I0o Twist, supra note 16, at 369.
ioi See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (Supp. 2009) (enacted in 2004).
1o2 The continued imbalance of power between victims and defendants, despite
[Vol. 101
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In addition to this constitutional imbalance, both defense advocates
and prosecutors have responded with great fear and trepidation when
confronted with expanded victims' rights. Defense advocates argue
that integrating victims into the criminal justice system will intrude on
defendants' constitutional rights. Prosecutors claim that expanded victims'
rights will diminish greatly needed prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors
also claim that victims' rights will add another variable into the already
complex web of prosecution. 103 Prosecutors may also fear that expanded
victims' rights will ultimately become their responsibility, in addition to
vindicating the government.
numerous efforts at legislation, has led several leading victims' commentators to renew their
efforts to amend the Constitution. See, e.g., Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26,
at 301-02. Sex trafficking cases, in particular, highlight the power imbalance between the
victim and the defendant in the courtroom. For example, unlike the defendant, a victim does
not have the right to counsel. Unlike the defendant, a victim is not a party to a criminal
proceeding. Thus, the role of the victim in a criminal case is reduced to an unrepresented piece
of evidence, vulnerable to further exploitation and degradation within the criminal justice
process. Hypothetically, a district court judge could allow defendants, in a sex trafficking case,
to subpoena the psychological and psychiatric records of the victim. The district court judge
could further allow defendants to use those records to cross-examine the victim. Unless the
government decides to oppose the district court, the victim is left completely vulnerable and
with little form of redress. Such power imbalance necessitates a constitutionally based equality
between victim and defendant. At a bare minimum, victims of violent crimes and sexually
related crimes, particularly juveniles, should have a constitutionally based right to counsel.
Without it, they are highly vulnerable to further humiliation, degradation, and exploitation
within the criminal justice process. The need for representation for sex trafficking victims is
the subject of my next law review article.
103 See generally Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal Mediation, 40
IDAHo L. REv. 571, 573, 593-597 (2004).
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The imbalance of power between victims and defendants and the
active resistance to the role of victims in the criminal justice process may
explain the failure of several corrective statutes, discussed later in this
section. The imbalance of historic power, active resistance toward, and lack
of political support and momentum may also explain Congress' failure to
define key provisions in the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), particularly
the victim's right to finality. These same detriments also explain renewed
efforts to amend the Constitution to include a victims' bill of rights. 4 In
order to comprehend the tension between victims' interests, defendants'
rights, and prosecutorial discretion, it is imperative to lay out the history
of the victims' rights movement, its culmination in the CVRA, and the
regenerative efforts to amend the Constitution.
A. Background
Centuries of American legal jurisprudence have created an imbalance
of power between victims and defendants. Since the founding of the
American Republic, the criminal justice system has typically treated crime
as a violation against societal order, which the government must vindicate,
not a private right of action between the accused and the accuser. As a
result, two litigants dominated the criminal court: the government and
the defendant. Within this contentious framework, the Constitution
endowed defendants with numerous procedural and substantive rights as
a proper restraint against government excess, particularly the power of the
government to violate a defendant's rights to life, liberty, and property.105
104 Id.
105 Twist, supra note 16, at 369-70.
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This bulwark of defendants' rights brings into sharp relief the
relative paucity of victims' rights within the context of the courtroom
and criminal prosecutions. The broad spectrum of defendants' rights
is one small portion of the larger historical context from which the
victims' rights movement emerged. The larger political and historical
context of the movement involved the highly contentious politicization
of crime. This politicization of crime became amplified in the mid-
1960s, which marks the birth of the movement as well as an increase
in crime.1°6 The period was also marked with the rise of the civil rights
movement, along with other grassroots activities, and backlash toward
all of those forces of change. 107 Within this cauldron swelled an increase
in criminal prosecution, an emphasis on defendants' rights, political
traction for "get tough on crime" agendas, and a simultaneous silencing
1o6 SeeALEXANDER,SUpra note Io, at4o-48; ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION:
VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 17-19 (1986); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim
Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims
of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 21, 26-27 (I999). There are numerous
explanations for this dramatic increase in crime. However, the following explanation is offered
to contextualize the beginning of the movement and the simultaneous politicization of crime
at the time of the movement's genesis. The 195os and I96Os marked a period of continuous
migrations of African Americans to northern urban centers in search of better living conditions
and away from the treachery and lynch mobs of the south. Alice M. Thomas, The Racial Wealth
Divide Through the Eyes of the Younger Family: Undoing America's Legacy of Wealth Inequality in
Search of the Elusive American Dream Utilizing A Sankofa Model of Transitional Justice, 5 FLA. A
& M U. L. REv. I, 16-1 7 (2009). Upon arrival in northern industrial centers, however, African
Americans often found themselves pitted against ethnic whites for wage labor. Blanche Bong
Cook, A Paradigm for Equality: The Honorable Damon J. Keith, 47 WAYNE L. REV. II 6 i, 1171
(2O02). During the Second Reconstruction, the gains of the civil rights era such as busing,
nominal residential integration and affirmative action placed the core of the New Deal
coalition, namely Blacks and working and middle class Whites, in bitter competition over jobs,
schools, neighborhoods and in a broader sense over intangibles such as prestige, authority
and social space. Id. For reasons directly related to racism, hegemony, and pseudospeciation,
many African Americans were shut out of an opportunity to integrate fully into the socio-
economic core or heartland of America, particularly in employment. Id. at 1 169; Clarence
Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Significance of Race and America's Drug Crisis, 1994
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 85 (1994). This refusal to integrate African Americans into the workforce,
coupled with systemic educational disadvantage, left many African Americans at the mercy
of underground and, often illegal, economies. Id. at 88. The problems of employment, the
increased drug trafficking trade, and the war on drug agendas, therefore, according to these
commentators, explain the sudden increase in crime statistics. As explained infra note 1o8, the
war on drugs and the politicization of crime provide important backdrops to the movement
and explain a part of its political traction.
107 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1o, at 4o-48; ELIAS, supra note io6, at I7-iq; Levine, supra
note Io, at 335, 341.
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of the victim's interest in favor of the defendant and the prosecution."'
io8 The movement emerged from a cauldron of competing narratives. "Get Tough
on Crime" agendas were just one of many historical examples of a populist hegemony. In
populist hegemony, ruling class whites use race to align the interests of poor and working
class whites with their own. Cook, supra note io6, at 1169. Using "Get Tough on Crime"
rhetoric, the Republican Party has successfully played the "race card" to break up the New
Deal Constituency. Id. at 1170-7 1. The "Get Tough on Crime" agenda "was a part of a highly
successful Republican Party strategy--often known as the Southern Strategy-of using
racially coded political appeals on issues of crime and welfare to attract poor and working
class white voters who were resentful of, and threatened by, desegregation, busing, and
affirmative action." Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 15 (201 1).
The following are two widely publicized examples of the GOP play of the "race card": (I)
Ronald Reagan's condemnation of the "Chicago welfare queen;" and (2) George Bush's use
of Willie Horton to represent the depraved criminal. See KENNETH O'REILLn, NIXON'S PIANO:
PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL POLITICS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 360,381--88 (1995). "[Rlacial
tensions in the New Deal coalition were further exacerbated by (I) race conscious remedial
measures that clashed with White working class-interests; and (2) the growth of suburbia,
which established a jurisdictional and geographic boundary between White counties and dark
cities." Cook, supra note io6, at 1171. "Republican party strategists found that thinly veiled
promises to 'get tough' on 'them'-the racially defined others---could be highly successful in
persuading poor and working class whites to defect from the Democratic New Deal Coalition
and join the Republican Party." Alexander, supra.
"The GOP's [vindication] of "victimized" and "innocent" White males provided the
party with a greatly needed cosmetic facelift. Once viewed as the party of the wealthy and
corporate America, the GOP used race and taxes to capitalize on the racial tensions within the
New Deal coalition. By appropriating the language and posture of political oppression, the
GOP became the advocate and defender of a new conservative egalitarianism, namely those
Whites who felt 'victimized' by remedial efforts to more fairly distribute power." Cook, supra
note 1o6, at 1171-72.
The "Get Tough on Crime" agendas created two images in the popular imagination: (I)
demonized black males as criminals, for example Willie Horton, and the contrasting (2) pure,
pristine, and innocent victim. As part of the demonization and vilification of black males,
for example, black men became synonymous with crack distribution. ALEXANDER, supra at lO
(stating the Reagan administration seized crack to publicize inner-city crack babies, crack
mothers, the so-called "crack whores," and drug-related violence in order to make inner-city
crack abuse and violence a media sensation that would bolster public support for the drug war
and would lead Congress to devote millions of dollars in additional funding to it).
The tension between the civil rights struggle and its retrenchment were also reflected
in jurisprudential philosophies. These philosophies primarily converged around the axis
of social injustice and individual responsibility. While liberals focused on the social causes
of crime; conservatives "concentrated on perceived individual wickedness as the cause of
crime." Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 943 (1985).
From the post-world War II era through the mid-196os, liberal theories on crime prevention
prevailed, emphasizing the protection of defendants from government excess; addressing the
social reasons for crime, such as poverty, marginalization, lack of education, discrimination;
and stressing rehabilitation in sentencing as opposed to punishment. Id. The liberal agenda
also addressed victims, "and took the form of 'victim's compensation' statutes in the early
and mid-sixties." Id. at 944. After the mid-i96os, however, liberalism began to wane in the
face of "the ever-present national fear of interracial crime"; the politicization of victims; and
"the reality and fear produced by photographs and news reports of riots, burning cities, and
vicious and barbaric crimes." Id. at 945 n.43 (citing S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN & RAPE 230 (1975) ("No single event ticks off America's political schizophrenia with
[Vol. 10I
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All of these forces gave rise to the movement. 109
It is important to note the ironic lineage of the movement in order to
politically and historically contextualize it."' Furthermore, the movement's
historic and political context explains its current form, potential problems,
and its agenda. Some commentators argue that conservatives have coopted
the dramatic symbol of the victim in order to advance a populist hegemony.
Regardless of that possible historical truth, victims' advocates on both sides
of the political spectrum agree that victims require more protection and
power to vindicate their own interests.
The movement found its genesis in competing narratives. The
movement started at the intersection of conservative "get tough on
crime" agendas and also grass roots civil rights organizations. Originally,
the movement assisted previously excluded crime victims through the
criminal justice process with the founding of victim assistance programs in
California, Washington, D.C., and Missouri."' However, the movement's
greater certainty than the case of a black man raping a white woman.... Racism and sexism
and the fight against both converge at the point of interracial rape, a baffling crossroads of
an authentic, peculiarly American, dilemma.")). Some may argue, therefore, that given the
perceived failures of liberalism and the effectiveness of a populist hegemony, conservatives
seized the useful symbol of victims to advance their political agenda.
1o9 Paul G. Cassell, a leading scholar in the field of victims' rights advocacy, has
chronicled and mapped the history of the movement in several publications. See, e.g., Cassell,
Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 303-05 (2012). Cassell has chronicled the history
of the movement in several publications. See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL
& STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 713-28 (3d ed. 2oio); Paul G. Cassell,
Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 1373 [hereinafter Cassell, Balancing the Scales]. Large parts of the instant section
are directly attributable to his work.
In addition, Judith Rowland, a former prosecutor and current victims' rights advocate,
interestingly characterizes the movement as follows:
A strong argument can be made that ordinary citizens, along with participatory
rights in the criminal process, should receive the same protections that criminals
do. It is precisely to these tasks that the victims' rights movement addresses itself.
It is neither an anti-defendants' rights movement, nor an attempt to undermine
the strength and fairness of the criminal justice process. The victims' rights
movement does, however, advocate a reexamination of the victim's place vis-a-vis
both the government and its duty to protect and to include victims as parties in
interest with standing of their own.
Judith Rowland, supra note 16, at 18i.
I io This contextualization is necessary in order to understand the movement's agenda,
priorities, and perhaps problems. For example, if the movement had as its priority poor and
disenfranchised persons of color, who are disproportionately impacted by violent crime, then
the movement's priorities might include counsel for crime victims as well as constitutional
safeguards. This is particularly important for the socio-economically disenfranchised because
they are often ill-served by the criminal justice process, lacking the means necessary to access
legal services and to navigate the criminal justice process.
III Initially, these programs focused on assisting women and young victims of sexual and
domestic violence. See Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie
Roper Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEwIs & CLARK
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interests also dovetailed with other emerging grass roots activities as well as
conservative "get tough on crime" agendas. While conservatives may have
coopted the symbolic value of victims, these other grass roots movements
included: "the women's movement, which focused on victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault; Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD);
the civil rights movement; and those who advocated on behalf of children,
consumers, homosexuals, and the elderly." ' Although these groups
had different political motivations and possible world views informing
their politics, all agreed that victims required rights and power to better
effectuate their interests and to protect themselves from a second wave of
trauma.
1 13
Between 1960 and 1970, highly publicized cases involving egregious
crimes and marginalized victims increased the movement's popularity,
public acceptance, and political momentum.1 4 No better examples exist
than the cases involving the namesakes of the CVRA, Scott Campbell,
Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn. All of
these individuals were brutally murdered and their families experienced a
second wave of violation through the criminal justice process. This second
wave of trauma included being excluded from the courtroom and court
proceedings, being refused an opportunity to have any meaningful input
during sentencing, and failing to receive notice of pending court dates and
continuances.115
L. REV. 58I, 584 (2005).
1 12 Danielle Levine, supra note i o, at 341.
1i3 Id.
114 Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 303 (citing Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 8o8, 834 (i99i) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted)). See generally
BELOOF, CASSELL & TWiST, supra note 109, at 3-35; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles:
The Victims' Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517 (I985); Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third
ModelofCriminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1 999); Collene
Campbell, Statement from the Author, 5 PHOENIX L. REv. 379 (2012); Abraham S. Goldstein,
Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515 (1982); William T Pizzi
& Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American
Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37 (1996); see also Cassell, Balancing the Scales, supra note io9, at
1381.
It is also interesting to note that the crime victims' rights movement gains momentum
alongside of what Michelle Alexander points to as the law and order rhetoric propagated by the
Republican Party to criminalize civil rights activists and to vilify blacks in an effort to obstruct
the Democratic Party's New Deal coalition, specifically using racially charged rhetoric, like
"Get Tough on Crime", to appeal to white sentiment and force alliance with the Republican
Party ALEXANDER, supra note i o, at 40-49.
15 As an example of the effectiveness of highly publicized cases to capture public
outrage and the compelling nature of crime victims' stories, Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), one of
the CVRA sponsors, compelling described the brutal murders of the CVRAs namesakes, all
of whom were victims of brutal murders, and the courts' treatment of their families as follows:
Scott Campbell, 27, the only son of Gary and Collene Campbell, was last seen on
April 16, 1982. He had planned to fly in a private plane to Fargo, North Dakota
[Vol. IO1
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The effective use of these highly publicized cases and their compelling
stories ignited public outrage. This outrage found further traction in the
"get tough on crime" agendas of the GOP and in particular, President
Regan.116 Reagan created the National Victims' Rights Week and the
President's Taskforce on Victims of Crime (the "Taskforce"). 117
In 1982, the Taskforce conducted several hearings and issued a report.
The report concluded that the American "criminal justice system had
with a man named Larry Cowell. Unbeknownst to Scott, Cowell and another man,
Donald Dimascio, planned to murder Scott. Dimascio was hiding in the back of
the plane. He broke Scott's neck and then the killers threw Scott's body into the
ocean, somewhere between the mainland of Southern California and Catalina
Island. His body was never found. During the trials, Scott's family was barred from
entering the courtroom, while the defendants' families were ushered to reserved
seats. Gary and Collene were never notified of proceedings in the case in the
District Court of Appeals, or of the pre-trial release of one of the killers. They
were never allowed to speak at critical stages of the proceedings, including the
sentencing for both murderers.
Stephanie Roper, 22, the daughter of Roberta and Vince Roper of Maryland,
was kidnapped by two men after her car broke down on April 3, 1982. Over the
next five hours, they repeatedly raped and tortured her. They then took her to
a deserted shack in another county and repeated these crimes. Stephanie made
several attempts to escape. When the killers recaptured her for the last time, they
beat her with logging chains, shot her to death, burned her body, and attempted
to dismember her. During the trials of the killers, the court excluded Stephanie's
family from the courtroom and never notified them of continuances.
Wendy Preston, 22, was murdered on June 23, 1977 in her parents' Florida
home. She was a geriatric nurse, and was visiting her mother and father, Bob and
Pat Preston, before leaving for the New York School of Ballet to begin a new career.
While out with her friends, she mentioned that her parents would not be home for
a while. The killer overheard her, found her parents' home, broke in to find money
to buy drugs, and murdered Wendy. Friends found her body six days later. Her
parents were told that the government of Florida was the "victim" in this case, and
that they would be notified only if they were to be called as witnesses.
Louarna Gillis, 22, John Gillis' only daughter, was murdered on January 17,
1979 as part of a gang initiation in Los Angeles. The quickest way to be initiated
into the "Mexican Mafia" was to murder the daughter of a Los Angeles Police
Department officer; John had been a homicide detective with the department and
was at the time serving as a sergeant on the Los Angeles Police Commission. The
killer targeted Louarna because he knew that she was the daughter of a police
officer. He picked her up a few blocks from her home, drove her to an alley, shot
her in the head as she sat in the car, pushed her into the alley, and then fired
additional shots into her back. The family was not notified of critical proceedings
in the killer's trial, including the arraignment. John, now the Director of the Office
for Victims of Crime of the U.S. Department of Justice, was not allowed to enter
the courtroom during the trial.
Nila Lynn, 69, of Peoria, Arizona, was murdered at a homeowner's association
meeting on April 19, 2000 by a man unhappy with the way the association had
trimmed the bushes in his yard. Nila and another woman were killed, and several
men were injured. Nila died on the floor in the arms of her husband, Duane.
They were three months short of their 5 oth wedding anniversary. Their children
paid for her casket with the money they had saved for an anniversary gift. Duane
wanted the killer to be sentenced to life without parole, rather than endure the
lengthy appeals of a capital case. Despite having clear constitutional and statutory
rights, Duane was not allowed to make a sentencing recommendation. The killer
received the death penalty.
Kyl et al., supra note i i i, at 582-83.
116 The movement dovetailed into President Reagan's political agenda to "Get Tough
on Crime." In her highly influential and probing work, The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander
notes, Reagan's racially coded get tough on crime strategies proved extraordinarily effective,
as twenty-two percent of all Democrats defected from the party to vote for him. ALEXANDER,
supra note i o, at 49. As Alexander notes, the year 1982 also marks the year Reagan announced
his war on drugs, a war that Alexander interestingly labels a "New Jim Crow." Id.
117 Kyl et al., supra note i i j, at 584.
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lost an 'essential balance' ... depriving 'the innocent, the honest, and the
helpless of its protection'... [and transforming crime victims into] a group
oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them.""' To correct
this imbalance, the Taskforce made several recommendations, including
a federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims' rights "to
be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings,"
including bail decisions, continuances, plea bargains, dismissals, sentencing,
and restitution. 9
Efforts to amend the Constitution, however, faced severe debate and
an insurmountable hurdle, requiring a two-thirds supermajority in both
the House and Senate.2 0 The amendment supporters never achieved
the requisite. support.' Consequently, the movement abandoned the
constitutional amendment and reached political compromises between
victims' advocates and congressional detractors. The compromises took the
form of federal statutes that endowed victims with several substantive and
procedural rights.' In 1982, the movement appeared to achieve part of its
objectives when Congress passed the first federal victims' rights statute, the
Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). 23 The VWPA granted crime
victims the right to make victim-impact statements at sentencing hearings
and provided for increased victim restitution.'24 After the enactment of
the VWPA, Congress attempted to expand the scope of these provisions
through additional legislation in the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,125 the
Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990,126 the Violent Crime Control
i18 Id. at 584-88.
119 Id. at 588-89; see also Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REv. 835,
842 [hereinafter Cassell, Recognizing Victims] ("The Task Force proposed adding to the Sixth
Amendment's protections for defendants' rights a provision allowing crime victims to be
present and heard: 'Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to
be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings."').
12o The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several states ....
U.S. CONsT. art. V
121 See Cassell, Recognizing Victims, supra note i ii, at 842.
122 See id. at 842-43.
123 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
124 Id. §§ 3-4. See also S. REP. No. 97-532, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2515.
125 Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1401-04, 98 Stat. 1837, 2170-
73, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1o6o-03 (2oo6)) (creating a crime fund and the
Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime).
126 Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 1o-647, tit. V, 104 Stat.
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and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,127 and the Victim Rights Clarification
Act of 1997.128
Initially, these statutory achievements appeared to advance victims'
interests, but eventually proved ineffective. 12 9 The 1997 trial of Oklahoma
City bomber Timothy McVeigh revealed the ineffectiveness of these
statutes. 3 ' During McVeigh's trial, the district court excluded any victim
wishing to provide sentencing statements from all court proceedings in the
case, including the trial.' The excluded victims had no right to appeal,
and therefore, no recourse.'32 After public outrage over the exclusion, 3 3 the
movement politically mobilized to amend the Constitution.
134
By the mid-1990s, the politicization of crime had turned decidedly
more conservative. 135 After successful discussions in Congress and with
the President,136 both democratic and republican representatives began
4789, 4820 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ io6Oi, io6o6 (2006)). The act created
a comprehensive bill of rights for crime victims in the federal criminal justice system
including: the right to be treated with fairness and respect; the right to be notified of all court
proceedings; the right to confer with the government's attorney; and the right to attend all
court proceedings. Id. at 4820.
127 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec.
2248, § 2259, io8 Stat. 1796, 1907-09 (codified as amended in scattered sections of i8, 21, 28
& 42 U.S.C. (2006)) (mandating restitution for sexual assault and domestic violence to abused
and sexually exploited children).
128 Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, I8 U.S.C. § 3510 (2oo6). This act clarified
for judges a crime victims' right to attend court proceedings even if the victim intends to
give impact testimony at sentencing, section 2 of the Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997,
following the highly publicized McVeigh case, infra note 129.
129 See H.R. REP. No. 1o8-71 i, at 4 (2004), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277
(noting the rights conferred by CVRA largely already existed in Title 42 of the United States
Code, but without any independent enforcement mechanism); see also United States v.
McVeigh, 1o6 E3d 325, 334-35 (ioth Cir. 1997) (holding that victims lacked independent
standing under 199 o statute to challenge sequestration order); Kyl et al., supra note I Ii,
at 586. But see Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (Supp. 2009). Unlike
previous victims' rights statutes, the CVRA provides crime victims standing to vindicate
eight procedural and substantive rights in criminal cases independently of prosecutors, id. §
3771 (d), and also imposes on the judiciary an affirmative, proactive duty to "ensure" that those
rights are "afforded," id. § 377 1(b).
130 See McVeigh, io6 E3d 325.
131 See id. at 328; see also 15o CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein).
132 McVeigh, 1o6 F3d at 335.
133 See Jo Thomas, Nerw Law Forces a Reversal in Oklahoma Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1997, at A18.
134 See Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly, supra note 18, at 867.
135 See supra note io8 and accompanying text; see also Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated
Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility And LIVOP Sentences, 1 o J.L. & FAst. STUD. 1 1, 31-
33 (2007) (discussing the politicization of crime in the context of juvenile cases).
136 See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 15, at 166. For more information about the federal
constitutional victims' rights amendment, see H.R.J. Res. Io6, I I 2th Cong. (2012) available at
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their efforts to amend the Constitution. On April 22, 1996, Senators Jon
Kyl (R-AZ), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), with
the backing of President Bill Clinton, introduced a federal victims' rights
amendment in the Senate.13' The intent of the amendment was to "restore
and preserve, as a matter of right for the victims of violent crimes, the
practice of victim participation in the administration of criminal justice that
was the birthright of every American at the founding of our Nation."138 The
amendment sought to extend the following rights to crime victims:
[Tihe right to reasonable and timely notice of any public
proceeding involving the crime and of any release or escape
of the accused; the rights not to be excluded from such public
proceeding and reasonably to be heard at public release, plea,
sentencing, reprieve, and pardon proceedings; and the right to
adjudicative decisions that duly consider the victim's safety,
interest in avoiding unreasonable delay, and just and timely claims
to restitution from the offender.3 9
Again, the amendment failed to achieve the requisite supermajority 4 °
Over the next eight years, Senators Kyl and Feinstein continued to propose
the amendment, but, despite the support of both Presidents Clinton and
Bush, the amendment failed to obtain the necessary supermajority 4 '
From 1996 through 2004, both the Senate and House held hearings
to consider the proposals. 4 The amendment received strong support;
http://www.nvcap.org/legis/i z/VRAtext.html.
137 Cassell & Joffee, supra note 15, at 166 (citing S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996)). It
is important to note that, in 1995, the politicization of crime had turned decidedly more
conservative than the ascendant years of liberalism from the post-world War II era through the
mid-I96os. See discussion, supra note io8. At this time, Democrats were equally competing
for the "Get Tough on Crime" mantel. See Alexander, supra note io8, at 17. As evidence of
democratic willingness to engage the posture of getting tough on crime, President Clinton's
policies resulted in the largest increases in federal and state prison inmates of any president
in American history. Id.
138 S. REP. No. 1o6-254, at 1-2 (2000).
139 S.J. Res. 1, io8th Cong. (2003) (emphasis added).
140 See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 15, at 166.
141 Despite the movement's contentious and ironic beginnings, the efforts to amend
the constitution were endorsed by Presidents and Attorneys General of both major political
parties and had broad, bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, in every state, and
among victim advocacy groups. See S. REP. No. 1o8-191, at 3-8 (2003). However, as discussed
throughout this article, support for the amendment lacked unanimity. Indeed, crime victims
and their advocates differed in their views about the proposed amendment. Some outright
opposed the amendment arguing that it was unnecessary, that it might prove harmful to
effective law enforcement and therefore counterproductive, and that it might infringe on
the constitutional rights of the accused. See id. at 57, 73, 82-87 (reflecting minority views
citing testimony of victims of September 1 i, 2001, terrorist attacks and of the Oklahoma City
bombing). Ultimately, the amendment's sponsors abandoned the proposal and replaced it
with the CVRA, recognizing that the CVRA would need further fine-tuning by the courts.
142 See H.J. Res. 48, io8th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. i, io8th Cong. (2003); H.J. Res. 91,
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however, there has never been enough momentum to overcome strong
minority opposition.'43 Given the Constitution's directive that amendments
can only be referred to the states upon a two-thirds vote of both houses,
the minority has continuously and successfully thwarted the amendment's
passage.'" Without the requisite political support to muster a chance
of passing, the amendment was never put to a vote on the Senate floor,
"but the mere fact that the Judiciary Committee approved the proposed
amendment revealed the resurgence of the victims' rights movement." 45
Critics of the amendment advance several reasons for opposing
it. These criticisms are noteworthy because they anticipate many of
the counter arguments against using the Barker test to substantiate a
victim's right to finality, discussed in greater detail in Part IV. These
criticisms include each of the following claims: (1) a statute'46 is more
appropriate to secure victims' rights, as opposed to an amendment;147 (2)
I07th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2002); H.J. Res. 64, io6th Cong. (i999); S.J. Res.
3, Io6th Cong. (1999); H.J. Res. 71, 1o5th Cong. (997); S.J. Res. 6, io5th Cong. 0997); H.J.
Res. 174, Io4th Cong. (1996); S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996).
143 Twist & Seiden, supra note 1 9, at 345.
144 Id.
145 Levine, supra note 1o, at 344.
146 Congressional opposition to an amendment argued that there was no "pressing need"
to justify amending the constitutions. See S. REP. No. io8-19i, at 57 (2003) ("Amendment is
appropriate only when there is a pressing need that cannot be addressed by other means. No
such need exists in order to protect the rights of crime victims .... Nothing in our current
Constitution inhibits the enactment of State or federal laws that protect crime victims.").
Contrary to claims made concerning the absence of a "pressing need," as discussed by
Cassell supra note 26 and Twist supra note 16, sex trafficking cases bring into sharp relief the
inequality between victims and defendants in the courtroom. Although only a defendant's
life, liberty, and property may be at stake in a criminal proceeding, victims are vulnerable to a
second wave of violations during the criminal justice process, which includes the right of the
accused to cross-examine victims vigorously; fear and anxiety from anticipated testimony,
which unreasonable delay may only exacerbate; invasions into the victims privacy; and an
inability to reach closure, again heightened by unreasonable delay. Unlike defendants, victims
do not have constitutionally endowed rights or the right to representation. As a result, victims
do not have the ability to defend themselves against what may sometimes be an assault by
the defendant against the victim in the courtroom. If the government does not defend the
victim, which is it not under an obligation to do, the victim is left vulnerable to the vagaries
of litigation without recourse or counsel. Unless victims receive equally endowed protections
in the constitution, defendant's rights will continue to trump victim's interest with little or no
check against abuses, save court and prosecutorial discretion. Thus, for victims, there is, in
fact, a pressing need that cannot be addressed, completely, by other means.
147 Again, detractors from the amendment argued that a statute, as opposed to an
amendment, would provide the necessary flexibility to adapt the adversarial system to a new
party to the litigation, namely victims. S. REP. No. 105-409, at 53 (1998) ("[Sluch an approach is
significantly more flexible. It would more easily accommodate a measured approach, and allow
for the 'fine tuning' if deemed necessary or desirable by Congress after the various concepts in
the Act are applied in actual cases across the country.") (quoting Letter from George P. Kazen,
Chief U.S. Dist. Judge, Chair, Comm. on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
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an amendment could "open a Pandora's box of dangerous and unintended
consequences,"'' 41 like restricting prosecutorial discretion, particularly
with regard to plea bargaining; (3) an amendment would undermine the
defendant's constitutional rights, such as the right to a fair trial; (4) an
amendment would impose tremendous costs on the system, including the
danger of providing crime victims with attorneys and the appointment of
more judges to alleviate case backlog; and (5) drafting an amendment is
highly problematic. 49 With each introduction into the Senate, the language
of the amendment changed significantly,10 thereby arming opponents with
claims that the frequent changes to the language reflected uncertainty
about the amendment's reach.'
After failing to achieve a supermajority, the movement mobilized
again around a comprehensive federal statute that could overcome the
deficiencies of the previous statutes.' The result was the Crime Victims'
Rights Act ("CVRA"). 5 3 The CVRA is a political compromise between
victims' rights advocates and their opposition.5 4 The CVRA gave nonparty
crime victims eight enumerated rights, along with the unprecedented
power to enforce those rights in the district court and, if necessary, in an
appellate court through mandamus relief.'55 It did not, however, disturb the
public prosecution model of criminal prosecutions, nor related principles
of prosecutorial discretion, nor the nonparty status of crime victims. On
April 21, 2004, Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced the CVRA, which
President Bush signed into law on October 9, 2004. At the time of its
ratification, it was heralded as "the most sweeping federal victims' rights
law in the history of the nation."
6
to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, at 2 (Apr. 17, 1997)). It should be
noted however, that fine-tuning is available through the courts through legal opinions should
victims receive a constitutional amendment. It should also be noted that victims have had a
statutory right to finality, which has remained undefined since 2004.
148 Atkins, supra note 22, at 1633 (citing S. REP. No. 108-191, at 58).
149 Id. (footnotes omitted).
150 Id. (comparing S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong. (1998), and S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. (1997),
with S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong. (zooz) and S.J. Res. 3, io6th Cong. (1999)).
15t Id.; see S. REP. No. to8-191, at 94 ("There have been some 64 drafts of this proposed
constitutional amendment, and they have differed substantially.... The fact that this proposal
changes in form and substance from year to year does not inspire confidence that we have
discerned the correct formulation.").
152 Cassell & Joffee, supra note 15, at 166-67 (citing Jon Kyl et al., supra note i i j, at
583).
153 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2oo6) (Supp. 2009).
154 See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 E3d lol 1, o 6 (9th Cir.
2006).
155 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (Supp. 2009).
156 Kyl et al., supra note iil i, at 583. Although the CVRA is a political compromise,
support for an amendment did not dissipate with the enactment of the CVRA. Notwithstanding
the enactment of the CVRA, the frustration of crime victims and their families continues to
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1II. 2004 CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT
The CVRA embodies a political compromise between victims' rights
advocates and congressional opposition to an amendment. 157 Because
Congress rushed to pass the CVRA, it suffers from a dearth of legislative
history.158 The sponsors of the bill abruptly introduced it after failing
to amend the Constitution."9 Neither the Senate nor the House held
hearings. 6 ' The Senate did not publish a committee report. 161 Although
the House published a report,'62 it failed to provide guidance, neglecting
to define a "crime victim," for example. 163 Despite this dearth of legislative
fuel the calls for a constitutional amendment. At the Congressional hearings on the proposed
amendment, relatives of the CVRA's namesakes testified to failures by the government and
courts to recognize their statutorily-guaranteed interests. See, e.g., S. REP. No. io8-191, at 9-10,
12. Indeed, several victims' right advocates have warned that the CVRA is merely a test.
Senator Feinstein warned: "This will be a test, and I, for one, will be watching it closely...
[W]e will see whether the enforcement rights contained in this bill are adequate. If not, you
can be sure as the Sun will rise tomorrow, we will be back with a constitutional amendment."
150 CONG. REC. S426o, S4 263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also
id. at S4266 (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("If it does not work, we will be able to come back and
pursue the constitutional remedy."). In the same vein, advocacy groups warned: "The new
victim rights act will surely advance our movement. Either it will prove to be totally effective
or it will prove at the Federal level what has been demonstrated repeatedly in the states-that
statutes alone do not insure that all victims have their rights recognized and enforced all
the time." Press Release, NVCAP, MADD, POMC, & NOVA, Nat'l Victims' Constitutional
Amendment Passage, Crime Victim Advocates Applaud Enactment of "Ground-Breaking"
Fed. Victim Rights Law (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.nvcap.org/docs/cvra[Press-
Release.doc.
157 150 CONG. REC. S426o, S4261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein); see Kenna, 435 E3d at i106.
158 See 150 CONG. REc. S426o, S4261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (discussing the victims' rights amendment's authors' struggles to garner support for
a federal constitutional amendment); Kyl et al., supra note i ii, at 588-91 (reciting the history
of the failed proposed victims' rights amendment); seealso Kenna, 435 F3d at 1015-16; United
States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319,323 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating CVRA legislative history
consists only of two floor statements by the statute's sponsors, Senators Dianne Feinstein and
Jon Kyl).
159 See 15o CONG. REC. S426o, S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) ("[Aifter numerous Judiciary Committee subcommittee hearings, committee
hearings, markups, putting the victims' rights constitutional amendment out on the Senate
floor in a prior session ... and recognizing that we didn't have the 67 votes necessary for a
constitutional amendment-both Senator Kyl and I ... decided that we should compromise.").
i6o Atkins, supra note 22, at 1635; see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 5 (2004) ("No
hearings were held in the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5107."), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2278.
161 Atkins, supra note 22, at 1635; see United States v. At. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 E
Supp. 2d 453, 460 (D.N.J. 2009) ("[Tlhere was no Senate Committee report on the CVRA.").
162 Atkins, supra note 22, at 1635.
163 Id. (citing Alt. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d at 460 ("The House Committee
report was silent on the meaning of that term, [referring to the definition of a victim under
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history, the CVRA incorporated several of the amendments provisions.' 64
As such, "the CVRA reads more like an amendment than a statute, with
sweeping statements of rights and no discussion of how those rights should
be implemented."
1 65
The floor statements of Senators Feinstein, Kyl, and Leahy do, however,
provide some insights into the CVRA's legislative intent.'66 In their floor
statements, the sponsors anticipated a wide category of crime victims,
67
and particularly victims of the most egregious violent crimes. 168 Indeed, the
CVRA's namesakes, 69 Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston,
Louarna, and Nila Lynn, were all violently murdered. Most importantly,
the bill's sponsors anticipated that the CVRA would evolve with future
clarifications.
170
the Act] .... ")). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1o8-7I (describing the underlying reasons for
the necessity of the bill, but providing little guidance as to its application, focusing instead
primarily on other portions of the bill dealing with DNA evidence and technology), reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274.
164 See 150 CONG. REC. $426o, S4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
("The legislation, as I will describe in a moment, will attempt to accomplish as much as
possible the same goals the Constitutional amendment which has been pending before us
would have accomplished.").
I65 Blondel, supra note i9, at 258.
166 At least one federal court has used the sponsors' floor statements, coupled with the
legislative history of the committee report for the abandoned constitutional amendment, to
derive a liberal reading of the CVRA and its provisions. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the
Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 E3 d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cit. zoo6).
167 See 150 CONG. REC. S426o, S247o (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
("A 'crime victim' is defined as a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of any
offense, felony or misdemeanor. This is an intentionally broad definition because all victims
of crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or not they are the victim of the count
charged.")
168 Atkins, supra note 22, at 1636; see 150 CONG. REc. S426o, S2464 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("The one circumstance that seemed to be the most
frequent is: My mother was murdered . . . and I could not attend the trial .... The other
circumstance ... [is] where a crime has been committed, the perpetrator has been convicted
and is in prison or jail, but unbeknown to the victim ... the individual gets out of jail."). It
is also interesting to note that every crime victim that the bill's sponsors invited to the floor
debate was a surviving family member of an individual who had been murdered. See id. at
S4265-66 (describing a victim whose wife was brutally murdered, a victim whose daughter
was killed, a victim whose son and brother were killed, and another victim whose daughter
was raped and murdered).
169 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
17o Atkins, supra note 22, at 1636 (citing 15o CONG. REC. S4z6o, S4272 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Fortunately, however, this is to be a statute, not a
constitutional amendment, and it can be modified and improved. We will be able to make
it better as we go along."); 15o CONG. REC. S4271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("Over time, we will be able to modify and fine-tune the statute so that it provides
an appropriate degree of protection for the rights of crime victims."); id. ("In addition, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist and others have pointed out, statutes are more easily corrected if we
find, in hindsight, that they need correction, clarification, or improvement.")). It could also be
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Through the CVRA, Congress integrated victims into all phases of the
criminal justice proceedings and attempted to protect them from a second
wave of victimization or secondary traumatization.1 The CVRA reflects
Congress's effort "to correct ... the legacy of ... poor treatment of crime
victims in the criminal process,""17 and to overcome the failings of previous
legislation. Through the CVRA, Congress ensured that crime victims were
no longer treated "like good Victorian children-seen but not heard."' 73
Congress drafted the CVRA to bring together three critical components:
"rights, remedies, and resources."174 The Act defines "crime victim" as "a
person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of
a federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia.""17 The Act
endows victims with the following eight enumerated rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving
the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public
court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and
convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim
would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony
at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea,
sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for
the Government in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in
law.
argued that the failings of the CVRA and experiments with it may further blueprint a possible
amendment.
171 Senator Kyl specifically addressed this point: "Too often victims of crime experience
a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal justice system." 150 CONG. REC. S4 z6 9
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
172 As Senator Feinstein explained, "(Ihis legislation is meant to correct, not continue,
the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process." 150 CONG. REC.
S426o, S4 269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
173 Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 E3d 1l1, 1013 (9th Cir.
2006).
174 150 CONG. REC. S426o, S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
175 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2oo6) (Supp. 2009).
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(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect
for the victim's dignity and privacy.
176
Despite Congress's clear intent to create enforceable rights, Congress
did not define "[tihe right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay."
The CVRAs sponsors, however, indicated that "[t]his provision does
not curtail the government's need for reasonable time to organize and
prosecute its case" or "infringe on the defendant's due process right to
prepare a defense."' 17 7 Rather, this right was intended to require courts to
reject motions to continue made only for the convenience of the parties
that go beyond either party's need to prepare. 7 ' The statute provides no
further guidance explaining when proceedings are unreasonably delayed.
No court has defined this right. Lacking this guidance, the provision
remains empty.179 In fact, critics of the CVRA have argued the CVRA
"fundamentally gives victims very little power," suggesting "perhaps
Congress simply was unwilling to abandon the existing public prosecution
model."' 8 ° The plain language of the CVRA, however, belies this claimed
congressional reluctance. The CVRA states, "[i]n any court proceeding
involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the
crime victim is afforded" these rights.' Courts have recognized that this
language places an independent proactive obligation on the judiciary to
ensure victims' rights under the CVRA.S2 As further emphasis, Congress has
176 I8 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (zoo6).
177 I5O CONG. REC. SIO,9I I (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
178 See id.
179 Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe has observed this failure: "[T]
here appears to be a considerable body of evidence showing that, even where statutory or
regulatory or judge-made rules exist to protect the participatory rights of victims, such rights
often tend to be honored in the breach . . . " Laurence H. Tribe, In Support of a Victims'
Rights Constitutional Amendment, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1997-98, at 53, S5. As a
consequence, Professor Tribe has concluded that crime victims' rights "are the very kinds of
rights with which our Constitution is typically and properly concerned." Id. at 54; see also Twist
& Seiden, supra note 19, at 355.
I8o Blondel, supra note 19, at 26o. It may also be true that Congress left certain provisions
empty in order to allow the courts to fine tune meaning on a case-by-case basis. Courts are
perfectly suited for this role. Grafting Barker onto a victim's right to finality may be the
exact kind of balancing Congress envisioned for the courts. Grafting would enable courts to
balance the interests of all parties involved while still recognizing a victim's right to finality.
See discussion infra Part IV.
181 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(I) (2006); In reWR. HuffAsset Mgmt. Co., 409 E3d 555, 561
(2d Cir. 2005).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Saltsman, No. 07-CR-641, 2007 WL 4232985, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (E.D.N.Y. zoo5);
United States v. Tobin, No. o4 -CR-216-o-SM, 2005 WL 1868682, at *1-2 (D.N.H. July 22,
zoo5).
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required that crime victims receive their rights "[i]n any court proceeding
involving an offense against a crime victim .... 13
Furthermore, under the plain language of the CVRA, Congress went
on to provide for mandatory mandamus to enforce victims' rights.", The
CVRA provides that "[tihe court of appeals shall take up and decide [a
petition for mandamus] forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has
been filed," and if the appellate court "denies the relief sought, the reasons
for the denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion."' 85
By providing for mandatory mandamus review, the CVRA corrected the
pre-existing federal statutory scheme, which lacked an enforcement
mechanism, replacing it with both the procedure and remedy for appeal.'86
Congress's use of the phrase "shall take up and decide," while
simultaneously referencing "mandamus," has unleashed a Pandora's
Box of debate concerning the appropriate standard of review for appeals
brought under the CVRA. 187 On one side, some judges and lawyers argue
for a restrictive reading of the CVRA. They claim that by using the term
"mandamus," Congress intended its traditional meaning, subject to a "clear
and indisputable right" standard of review.'88 On the other side, victims'
rights advocates argue for a much more expansive reading of the CVRA.
They claim that Congress intended the words "shall take up and decide"
to transform the traditionally discretionary mandamus standard into a
mandatory standard requiring ordinary appellate review, such as abuse
of discretion, legal error, or de novo, depending on the circumstances.' 89
183 18 U.S.C. § 377i(b)(i) (2006).
184 See 18 U.S.C. § 377 1(d)(3) (zoo6) ("the movant may petition the court of appeals
for a writ of mandamus"); 18 U.S.C. § 3 7 7 1(d)(5)(B) (2oo6) ("A victim may make a motion to
re-open a plea or sentence only if... the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus within 1o days...."); In re WR. Huff Asseihigmt. Co., 409 F3d at 562.
I85 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2oo6).
186 Remarking on the need for the CVIRA to fix the lack of an enforcement mechanism,
Senator Kyl referenced the McVeigh debacle as follows:
This legislation is meant to ensure that cases like the McVeigh case, where victims
of the Oklahoma City bombing were effectively denied the right to attend the
trial[,] [do not occur againl and to avoid federal appeals courts from determining,
as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did, that victims had no standing to seek
review of their right to attend the trial tinder the former victims' law that this bill
replaces.
150 CONG. Ric. S1o,91o-1 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
187 See, e.g., In re Simons, 567 F3 d 8oo, 8oi (6th Cir. 2009) (noting the "split of authority
among the circuit courts as [to] whether a petition for a writ of mandamus under the CVRA is
reviewed under the traditional standard applied to petitions under the All Writs Act or a more
lenient, appellate-review standard").
188 Id.
189 Under traditional mandamus reviewv, a writ of mandamus is an "extraordinary
remedy." In re WR. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F3d at 562. A court "grants mandamus relief
when the district court has usurped power or clearly abused its discretion." Id. A writ of
mandamus may issue only if (i) the petitioner has "no other adequate means" to attain the
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Regardless of the compromises made in assessing the standard of review,
Congress provided victims with a right to finality. Although undefined, both
the right and the means of its enforcement exist. Most importantly, the
means of substantiating a victim's right to finality already exist in speedy
trial jurisprudence.19
IV. HARMONIZING THE VICTIM's RIGHT TO FINALITY
Despite CVRA's problems, Congress recognized the need for victims of
violent crimes to have finality and closure. Through the CVRA, Congress
endowed victims with a right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
Congress gave victims the means to enforce this right through a writ of
mandamus. However, the right has remained largely dormant for nine years
in part because neither Congress nor any court has defined it. Nevertheless,
the CVRA sponsors understood that a victim's right to finality would evolve
through additional clarification.i 91 The CVRA sponsors also understood
that courts had to balance a victim's interest in finality against the rights
desired relief; (z) the petitioner has demonstrated a right to the issuance of a writ that is "clear
and indisputable;" and (3) the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, is satisfied that the
writ is "appropriate under the circumstances." In re United States, 397 F 3d 274, 282 (5th Cir.
2005) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)). Accordingly,
"mere error, even gross error in a particular case, as distinguished from a calculated and
repeated disregard of governing rules, does not suffice to support issuance of the writ." In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 733 Ezd 1o, 13 (zd Cit. 1984) (quoting United States v.
DiStefano, 464 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir. 1972)).
The standard is not as clear for writs of mandamus under the CVRA. No statutory
prescription or historical tradition exists to determine the appropriate standard. WR. Huff
AssetMgmt. Co. 409 E3d at 563. As a result, circuit courts are divided as to whether a writ of
mandamus under the CVRA should be reviewed under these traditional mandamus standards
or under a more lenient, appellate-level review. See In re Simons, 567 F3d 8oo, 8oi (6th Cit.
2009) (noting the "split of authority among the circuit courts as [to] whether a petition for
a writ of mandamus under the CVRA is reviewed under the traditional standard applied to
petitions under the All Writs Act or a more lenient, appellate-review standard"). The cases
underscore that the standard of review affects the expansiveness of the CVRA itself. Compare
In re Dean, 527 E3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying traditional mandamus standard to
petition under CVRA), and In re Antrobus, 519 F3 d 1123, 1 125 (ioth Cir. 2008) (same), with
WR. HuffAsset Mgmt. Co., 409 E3d at562-63 (finding more lenient abuse of discretion standard
applicable to victims' petitions under the CVRA), and Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cen.
Dist. of Cal., 435 F3d io i, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
19o See discussion infra Part IV
191 15o CONG. REc. S426o-or, S4272 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("Fortunately, however, this is to be a statute, not a constitutional amendment, and it can be
modified and improved. We will be able to make it better as we go along."); id. at S4271 ("Over
time, we will be able to modify and fine-tune the statute so that it provides an appropriate
degree of protection for the rights of crime victims."); id. at S4z71 ("In addition, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist and others have pointed out, statutes are more easily corrected if we find,
in hindsight, that they need correction, clarification, or improvement.").
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and interests of both the government and defendant. 19 This clarification
is readily available in centuries of jurisprudence undergirding defendants'
right to a speedy trial. This jurisprudence has already balanced the need for
judicial economy against the interests of the litigants.
Grafting the Barkerv. Wingo test onto victims' right to finality provides
traction and substance to the right, while simultaneously balancing the
rights of all parties. Grafting Barker also demonstrates that crime victims'
interests do not stand in opposition to defendants' rights but rather parallel
to them. Victims are not entitled to proceedings free from any delay; rather,
victims are entitled to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.193 By
using the Barker test in the context of victims' rights, courts would retain
the ultimate power to harmonize any conflicts between the defendant's
rights and the victim's interest. 194
A. Applying Barker
The Barker v. Wingo test can be retrofitted to substantiate the victim's
right to finality while simultaneously balancing the needs and interests of
all litigants. 19 In applying the test, the courts would weigh the same four
variables: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) whether and
when the victim asserted her right; and (4) whether the victim suffered
prejudice as a result of the delay.196 It is imperative to note, however, that
the victim's right to finality, like the defendant's right to a speedy trial, has
an amorphous quality because it must exist in harmony with competing
interests. Like a defendant's right to a speedy trial, a victim's right to finality
cannot be quantified into a specified number of days, months, or years. As a
result, any inquiry into whether the right has been violated would require
192 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(i) (2oo6); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006) ("the movant may
petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus"); 18 U.S.C. § 377 1(d)(5)(B) (Supp. 2009)
("A victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if... the victim petitions
the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within Jo days .... ").
193 See Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note z6, at 301-02.
194 "The concept of harmonizing rights is not a new one." Cassell, Victims' Rights
Amendment, supra note 26, at 316 (citing Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embedthe Rights
of Victims in The Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5). "Courts have harmonized rights in
the past; for example, accommodating the rights of the press and the public to attend criminal
trials with the rights of criminal defendants to a fair trial." Id. Courts, therefore, are free to do
the same with the victim's right to finality under the CVRA.
195 Cassell argues that the case law underlying Barkerv. Wingo and the defendant's right
to a speedy trial can support a constitutional amendment authorizing a victim's right to finality.
Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 316. Nothing in this article should be
construed as supplanting any effort to amend the Constitution to provide for victims' rights.
Instead, the instant article provides for an interim measure, utilizing the existing CVRA until
such time as victims are able to gain the requisite level of political support to amend the
constitution.
t96 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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a functional analysis of the right in the particular facts and context of the
particular case.
1. Length of Delay.-The court would determine the first prong: whether a
delay occurred.' 97 As the Court reasoned in Barker, it would be impossible
to determine with precision when the right to finality has been denied.
98
Thus, it would not be possible to fix a specific number of days when the
right is violated. If, for example, the defendant moves for a sixty day
continuance in order to accommodate a key defense witness, granting the
continuance would not violate a victim's right. 99 The victim's right would
necessarily succumb to the defendant's legitimate interest in taking the
time necessary to launch a viable defense. However, in some circumstances,
the record may demonstrate an effort by the defendant to deliberately
delay the proceedings in order to thwart a speedy resolution, including
efforts to exhaust the victim or some other strategic or tactical reason. In
such cases, courts may find a violation. Given the many variables at work in
a prosecution, it is impossible to outline every occasion in which a violation
may occur. °00 Nevertheless, the flexibility of the Barker test is suited for
a careful analysis of each individual case and the competing interests at
stake.
As in Barker, the length of the delay serves as a threshold or "triggering
mechanism" for analysis.2 0' However, courts would have to adjust the
time the "speedy clock" starts and when it stops to accommodate the
rights and interests of the victim. As with a defendant's right to a speedy
trial, the victim's right would start, or vest, at the moment of the charging
instrument. Statutes of limitations arguably protect a victim's interest
prior to the charging instrument.202 Statutes of limitations also protect the
government's ability to investigate and build a viable case, while preventing
undue delay in initiating a prosecution.2 03 Unlike a defendant, however, the
197 See In re Simons, 567 E3 d 8oo, 8o (6th Cir. 2oo9).
198 Barker, 407 U.S. at 521.
199 See id. at 522-23 (noting that "[ilf, for example, the State moves for a 6o-day
continuance, granting that continuance is not a violation of the right to speedy trial unless
the circumstances of the case are such that further delay would endanger the values the right
protects.")
200 It is imperative to note, as the court did in Barker, that a victim's right to finality, like a
defendant's right to a speedy resolution, is necessarily relative and it is consistent with delays;
however, the defendant's right to a speedy resolution "does not preclude the rights of public
justice." Id. at 522 (quoting Beavers v Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905)).
201 Id. at 530.
202 But see United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. i, 15 (1982) (Marshall, J. dissenting)
(arguing that speedy trial should extend beyond the actual charging instrument).
203 Statute of limitations guard against delay betveen the time the government
discovers sufficient evidence to proceed against a suspect and the time of instituting those
proceedings and represent a legislative judgment with regard to permissible periods of delay.
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victim's interest does not vest when a defendant is arrested, as it is not
the victim's interest in finality at issue. The time between the arrest and
the charging instrument belongs to the defendant's quiver of rights, which
both the Sixth Amendment and SPA protect.
As to the time that the victim's speedy clock stops, unlike a defendant,
the CVRA extends the victim's right to finality beyond voir dire through
sentencing, the judgment, and appeal. In addition, a victim's need for
closure extends beyond the beginning of a trial and may be infringed by
unreasonably long periods of delay during both trial and appeals. The
plain language of the CVRA supports this interpretation. According to
the CVRA, victims have the right "to proceedings free from unreasonable
delay.""° Thus, the CVRA entertains multiple proceedings, which would
include sentencing as well as appeals. In fact, the victim's other enumerated
rights under the CVRA specifically entitle victims "to full and timely
restitution ' 5 as well the right to be heard at sentencing,2 06 all of which
extend beyond voir dire. 07
Just as in Barker, a delay of at least one year in bringing a defendant
to trial would trigger a rebuttable presumption of violation, with the level
of judicial scrutiny increasing in direct proportion to the length of delay.
Depending on the circumstances of each individual case, a longer delay
may be permissible and a shorter delay rhay be impermissible, depending
on the circumstances. For example, reasonable delay in prosecuting a basic
street crime is considerably less than for a complex conspiracy, RICO, or
CCE charges.
2. Reason for the Delay.-This second prong presents the courts with an
opportunity to weigh all of the competing interests between the government,
defendant, and victim against the backdrop of judicial economy and
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 1496 (2004).
204 18 U.S.C. § 377I(a)(2)(7) (2oo6).
205 18 U.S.C. § 377I(a)(2)(6).
206 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a)(2)(4). The Sentencing Guidelines also provide a policy statement
regarding victims' rights. The Guidelines state that, "[iun any case involving the sentencing of
a defendant for an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim
is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA] and in any other provision of Federal law
pertaining to the treatment of crime victims." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6AI.5
(2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. 2009)).
207 As further evidence of Congress intent to vest victims with a right to timely
proceedings beyond voir dire, the CVRA mandates that the court of appeals "shall take up and
decide" mandamus petitions "within 72 hours after the petition has been filed." The seventy-
two hour window further evinces Congress' sensitivity toward a victims' right to speediness
as well as a victim's rights to timely proceedings, which include mandamus review. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3 771(d)(3) (2006).
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efficiency.0 8 Under this prong, courts would be free to subtract reasonable
delay from the equation, including the time a defendant needs to build
a viable defense. 09 Moreover, courts would have the necessary discretion
to accommodate delays for case-specific needs. Applying Barker would
not supplant a defendant's rights nor make victims co-equal parties in
the criminal justice process. Rather, all of the following would be deemed
appropriate reasons for delay: a defendant's right to file motions and have
those motions decided; any time necessary to prepare a viable defense,
including the time needed to track down witnesses, study scientific
evidence, and meet with experts; any periods necessary to file and decide
interlocutory appeals or the victim's writs of mandamus; time needed
to determine the defendant's competency or physical capacity; delays
occasioned by the defendant's transfer or removal; any time necessary to
transport the defendant; and the time the trial court may need to consider a
plea agreement. By subtracting this time, courts would balance the victim's
rights against those of the defendant, not supplant one for the other or
privilege one over the other.
However, a defendant's efforts to delay proceedings in an effort to
exhaust or frustrate the victim should be weighed against the defendant
and in favor of the victim's right to closure. Examples of impermissible
conduct that might be deemed violative of the victim's right to a speedy
disposition include: (1) knowingly setting a case for trial without disclosing
the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable; (2) filing a motion
solely for the purpose of delay, knowing the motion is totally frivolous and
without merit; and (3) making false statements for the purpose of obtaining
a continuance which are material to the granting of a continuance.
Similarly, as in speedy trial jurisprudence, the government's attempt
to delay the trial deliberately in order to hamper the defense should be
weighed heavily against the government.2 " This weighing should not
cause waves of alarm among the ranks of prosecutors, because current
precedent rests primary responsibility for expeditious prosecutions with
both the government and courts. Arguably, the plain language of CVRA
further solidifies a preexisting, affirmative, and proactive duty on the
courts to conduct proceedings expeditiously. The Act mandates that courts
208 The CVRA Senate sponsors indicated that the statutory right to proceedings free
from unreasonable delay neither "curtail[s] the Government's need for reasonable time to
organize and prosecute its case" nor "infringe[s] on the defendant's due process right to
prepare a defense." See 150 CONG. REC. S4 268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein). On the other hand, delays for other reasons, particularly "for the mere convenience
of the parties," must take into account the victim's countervailing interest in a speedy trial.
Id. at S4269.
2o9 Reasonable delay would also include all periods of time specifically enumerated in
the SPA. 18 U.S.C. § 3 161(h)(i) (2oo9).
2 1 o Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
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"ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described" therein.!"
Thus, the plain language of the CVRA envisions proactive measures by the
court to safeguard a victim's right to closure and finality."' 2
As in Barker, since the responsibility of overcrowded courts and
negligence must rest with the government and not the defendant or victim,
these neutral reasons for delay should be weighed less heavily. Courts
should give less weight to neutral reasons for delay, such as negligence,
overcrowded courts, heavy dockets, or excessive time to decide complex
motions; however, courts would consider these factors because the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances rests with the government and the
courts rather than with the defendant or victim. In these particular cases
the use of Barker would simply provide victims an opportunity to raise an
issue that precedent has already established."t 3
3. Assertion of Rights.-In the context of victims' rights, this third prong
highlights a profound obstacle for victims and paradox in the CVRA.
1 4
The plain language of the CVRA requires an affirmative assertion of the
victim's enumerated rights, including the right to finality."1 5 The CVRA
correctly requires this assertion at the trial court level because the district
court should have an opportunity to correct a problem, particularly where
it occupies a front row view of the complexities and vagaries of the
211 18 U.S.C. § 377i(d)(3) (2006).
212 If, for example, a defendant files a speedy trial motion demanding a prompt trial
or a continuance, seeking delay, the court should, sua sponte, raise the victim's interest in
finality as part of the variables the court must consider. 18 U.S.C. § 377 1(a)(7) (2006); United
States v. Turner, 367 F Supp. 2d 319, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). In addition to the proactive duty
placed upon the court, the CVRA explicitly requires that "[tihe reasons for any decision
denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on the record." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)
(2006). Although not codified as part of§ 3771, the CVRA also includes a requirement that the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts report annually to Congress, on a court-by-
court basis, "the number of times that a right established in chapter 237 of Title 18, United
States Code, is asserted in a criminal case and the relief requested is denied and, with respect
to each such denial, the reason for such denial, as well as the number of times a mandamus
action is brought pursuant to chapter 237 of Title 18, and the result reached." Pub. L. No.
108-405, § 104(a).
213 See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657 (1992) ("The Government,
indeed, can hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in concluding a criminal
prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to justice; the
more weight the Government attaches to securing a conviction, the harder it will try to get
it.").
214 Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 328.
215 The CVRA's "Enforcement and Limitations" section requires an assertion of any
enumerated right in the following language:
The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court
in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is
underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.
18 U.S.C. § 377 1(d)(3) (2oo6).
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prosecution."1 6 The district court is in the best position to decide whether
relief is warranted under the CVRA, as it has insights into the complexities
of a pending litigation. 17 The district court is also in a position to adjust
the speed of the proceedings. Similarly, most of the rights provided to
crime victims under the CVRA, including the right to finality, require an
assessment of "reasonableness."1 18 The district court is in the position to
make these assessments and to determine what constitutes "a reasonable
procedure" for affecting these rights. 19 Furthermore, the trial court is in a
privileged position to police the efficiency of the proceedings.
The CVRA does not, however, mandate that the victim assert the
right.2 0 It could be that the government could assert the right to finality
on behalf of the victim. However, there may be circumstances in which the
government and the victim do not share the same interests in finality. For
example, delay may work to the government's advantage, when the same
period of delay may prejudice the victim. Given that the victim and the
government may have a divergence of interests, there is no guarantee that
the government would file a motion on the victim's behalf.21
Unlike defendants, however, victims of violent crimes are not guaranteed
an attorney. More often times than not, victims of violent crimes are rarely
persons of means. This is particularly true for sex trafficking victims.
Victims proceeding pro se face near insurmountable hurdles in navigating
the criminal justice process, let alone in obtaining a writ of mandamus.
This absence of representation, which disproportionately affects persons
of color, has led many to argue that victims of violent crimes, particularly
juvenile victims of violent crimes, should be afforded the right to counsel.
2
Without representation a victim's ability to vindicate any right is a fiction.
216 See id.; In reW.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC, 409 F 3 d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005).
217 In re W.R. Huff, 409 Fd at 563.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 The CVRA's "Enforcement and Limitations" section requires an assertion of any
enumerated right in the following language:
The Crime Victim or the Crime Victim's Lawful Representative, and the attorney
for the government may assert the rights in subsection (a).
i8 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) (2006).
221 It should also be noted that the government does not represent the victim. The
victim is not the government's client; rather, the prosecution represents the interests of the
public. As the Supreme Court has explained:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935).
222 According to Tribe and Cassell:
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Given these difficulties, as with a defendant's assertion of the speedy
trial right, victims should not be deemed to have waived their right to
finality simply through failing to assert it or remaining silent in the face
of continuances.223Rather, the circumstances of the victim's assertion,
or lack of it, like that of the defendant's, should be one factor weighed
within the context of the case, but should not alone be dispositive.2 2 4 This
is particularly true where victims are unaware-as they often are-that
continuances are being requested or granted and therefore are not in a
position to object. This unawareness may also require victims to be notified
of motions to continue and to have an opportunity to object on the record.
There may also be cases where both the defendant and victim assert
that their respective rights to a speedy resolution have been violated. There
may be cases where both the defendant and victim agree that there has
been unnecessary delay where, for example, defense counsel acquiesces in
long delay without adequately informing the defendant, or in cases where
the court has not appointed counsel for the defendant for an inordinate
period of time. Indeed, providing traction to the victim's right may also
strengthen the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy resolution in
these circumstances. However, as discussed later in this section, dismissal is
not a viable remedy for the victim. Instead, courts would be free to fashion
an appropriate remedy.
Congress and the states already have passed a variety of measures to protect the
rights of victims. Yet the reports from the field are that they have all too often been
ineffective. Rules to assist victims frequently fail to provide meaningful protection
whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference,
sheer inertia or the mere mention of an accused's rights-even when those rights
are not genuinely threatened.
Moreover, because we lack the resources to provide victims the guiding
hand of appointed legal counsel in the criminal process, victims are largely left to
stumble on their own through a "haphazard patchwork" of rules "not sufficiently
consistent, comprehensive or authoritative to safeguard victims' rights," the
Justice Department concluded after careful study. Empirical confirmation of this
failure comes from a National Institute of Justice study reporting that today "large
numbers of victims are being denied their legal rights." The same study found
that victims' rights are more frequently denied to racial minorities and presumably
other disfavored groups who are unable to assert their interests effectively. Only
an unequivocal constitutional mandate will translate paper promises into real
guarantees for all victims.
Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Perspective on the Law; Embed the Rights of Victims in the
Constitution; A Proposed Amendment Protects Victims, Without Running Roughshod over the Rights
That Are Due the Accused, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 663 (2005); see also Tlanya Asim Cooper,
Sacrificing the Child to Convict the Defendant: Secondary Traumatization of Child Witnesses by
Prosecutors, Their Inherent Conflict of Interest, and the Need for Child Witness Counsel, 9 CADOZO
PUB. L. Po'y & ETHICS J. 239, 244 (201 1).
223 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972) ("We reject, therefore, the rule that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right."); Cassell, Victims' Rights
Amendment, supra note 26, at 328.
224 Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 339 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at
531-32).
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4. Prejudice.-As to the fourth prong, victims may not experience prejudice
in the same manner as defendants. Victims obviously do not experience
the pain of pre-trial incarceration or the impairments that long passages of
time can cause to the defendant's ability to defend. Nevertheless, victims
do experience prejudice. The subsequent prejudice to the victim should
be assessed in light of the right Congress designed to protect. Seen in this
light, prejudice to the victim may include pain and anxiety caused by a
lack of finality; the withering ability of the victim to testify and pinpoint
evidence that can corroborate the victim's testimony; the victim's loss of
memory caused by long delays; deliberate attempts by the defendant to
wear down the victim's resolve to testify; and interruption to the victim's
ability to lead a normal life as a result of inordinate delay."2 5 Arguably the
damage caused by unreasonable delay to the witness's ability to recall past
events "skews the fairness of the entire system." ' 6 This is particularly
problematic where the loss of the witness's memory may not be reflected
in the record because what has been forgotten cannot be demonstrated.2 7
B. Remedy
The remedy for a constitutional violation of the defendant's right to
a speedy trial is dismissal of the indictment or reversal of the conviction
if the assertion of the right is made post trial.22 8 The Supreme Court
has noted that this remedy is "unsatisfactorily severe" but "is the only
possible remedy," reasoning that a speedy trial violation, unlike other Sixth
Amendment rights, cannot be cured by a new trial.22 9 Obviously, dismissal
of the charge or reversal of the conviction is no remedy for victims. Again,
speedy jurisprudence would have to be modified to accommodate the
rights, needs, and interests of the victim. Courts should fashion a remedy
based on the particular interest invaded in the particular case.
225 The ineffectiveness of the CVRA has left many victims' rights advocates, including
Cassell, to re-assert the need for a constitutional amendment. Cassell also suggests that:
In the wake of the passage of a Victims' Rights Amendment, Congress could revise
the Speedy Trial Act to include not only defendants' interests but also victims'
interests, thereby answering any detailed implementation questions that might
remain. For instance, one desirable amplification would be a requirement that
courts record reasons for granting any continuance. As the Task Force on Victims
of Crime noted, "the inherent human tendency [is] to postpone matters, often
for insufficient reason," and accordingly the Task Force recommended that the
"reasons for any granted continuance ... be clearly stated on the record."
Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note z6, at 328 (quoting Lois HAIGHT HERRINGTON
ET AL., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME: FINAL REPORT (1982), http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf).
226 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
227 See id. (discussing prejudices to the defendant caused by long passages of
unreasonable delay to the entire prosecution).
228 Id. at 522.
229 Id.
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In re Simons provides an illustrative example of a court fashioning
a remedy suited to the particularities of the case. 30 There, the victim
witness moved the trial court to unseal the record. The Sixth Circuit held
that the failure of the district court to rule on the motion for a three-
month period could be "construed as an effective denial of rights under
the CVRA, ' 3' particularly where the CVRA directs the district court to
"take up and decide any motion asserting a victim's right forthwith. 232 In
fashioning a remedy, the Sixth Circuit directed the district court to rule on
the victim's motion two weeks from the entry of its order. 33 Interestingly,
Judge Clay dissented, arguing that the district court should not be allowed
an additional two weeks to decide the motion, but should be directed to
unseal "forthwith."
2 34
Another illustrative example of a court fashioning a balanced-yet
substantive-remedy is found in United States v. Tobin. 35 There, the
government alleged that the defendant "conspired with others to interfere
with New Hampshire citizens' rights to vote freely, by jamming phone
lines set up to facilitate the 'get out the vote' efforts by the NHDP
[New Hampshire Democratic Party] and the Manchester Professional
Firefighters' Association." The NHDP, as the victim, filed an objection to
a second continuance in the case. The district court rejected the victim's
objection. In doing so, the court correctly reasoned: "Congress, in enacting
the CVRA did not mean to undermine the Speedy Trial Act, nor to deprive
either criminal defendants or the government of a full an[d] adequate
opportunity to prepare for trial." 3 ' As a result, the court did not find that
a trial within seven months of the superseding indictment constituted
"unreasonable delay. '2 37 Although the court rejected the victim's motion,
it concluded:
[Riecognizing the statutory right of victims (which, if the
allegations are proven, include the entire body-politic and not
just the organized NHDP) and taking into account the court's
statutory obligation to "ensure that [all] crime victim[s][are]
afforded the rights described," the parties are hereby put on
notice that no further continuance will be granted in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances.
38
230 In re Simons, 567 F3d 8oo (6th Cir. 2009).
231 Id. at 8o i.
232 Id. at 8oo (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2oo6) (Supp. 2009)).
233 Id. at 8oi.
234 Id. at 801-02 (Clay, J., dissenting).
235 United States v. Tobin, No. o4-CR-2i6-o I-SM, 2005 WL 1868682 (D.N.H. July 22,
2005).
236 Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
237 Id.
238 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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It is imperative to note that, as a result of the victim's efforts to avoid
unreasonable delay, the court put all parties on notice that it was actively
policing the speed of the proceedings. 39
C. Harmony
Several commentators speculate that Congress deliberately left
provisions of the CVRA undefined because it did not want to abandon
the public prosecution model.140 Indeed, defense advocates assert that
expanded victims' rights will violate centuries of constitutionally recognized
defendants' rights and*the "zone of protection," with enormous expense to
tax payers.141 Prosecutors also fear that more powerful victims' rights will
add another complexity to the already dizzying problems inherent in any
prosecution. These same critics also claim that the CVRA threatens both
prosecutorial and judicial independence.
42
Despite its criticisms, however, Congress has in fact acted. Through
the CVRA, Congress has endowed victims of violent crime with eight
enumerated rights and the means for their enforcement. As Cassell and
Tribe correctly point out, "[tihese are the very kinds of rights with which
our Constitution is typically and properly concerned-rights of individuals
to participate in all those government processes that strongly affect their
lives." '43 Although a victim's right to finality is not constitutionally endowed,
it is a creation of statute. Rather than supplanting defendants' rights and
the government's interests, grafting Barker onto the victim's right to finality
is one example of the manner in which courts can properly balance the
needs and interests of all litigants in the field of criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court in Barker concerned itself with judicial efficiency,
judicial economy, and a balancing of all the interests involved in criminal
prosecution. Barker's four-prong test, therefore, is divinely suited to
provide closure to victims without supplanting the defendant's rights and
the government's interests. The ad hoc Barker v. Wingo test is sufficiently
flexible to accommodate varying circumstances and interests. The test
protects the legitimate interests of prosecutors and the rights of the
239 See also Fern L. Ketter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Crime
Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 8 U.S.C.A. § 3771, z6 A.L.R. FED. 2D 451 (2008) (collecting cases
in which courts have enforced victims' right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay).
24o E.g., Blondel, supra note 19, at 260.
241 See Atkins, supra note 22, at 1649 (discussing legislators' concerns of possible
problems resulting from expanded victims' rights).
242 See, e.g., Blondel, supra note 19, at 240.
243 Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims' Rights
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 479, 523 (1999) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell,
Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5).
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defendants, while adding recognition and guidance for equally compelling
victims' interests.244
As set forth in Part I, the defendant's right to a speedy trial is designed,
among other things, to prevent unreasonably long pretrial incarceration, "to
minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation,"' 45 and "to
limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused
to defend himself." 46 The interests underlying a speedy trial, however, are
not limited to the defendant alone. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that:
[T]here is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which
exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests
of the accused. The inability of courts to provide a prompt trial
has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts which,
among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more
effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise
manipulate the system. 247
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged a societal interest in a
speedy trial, many victims' rights scholars note that this right has a limited
existence given the defendant's right to a speedy trial and the CVRA's
limitations. Moreover, the Bill of Rights does not address the rights and
interests of "society" or the victim. Consequently, as Cassell asserts, "[VI
ictims frequently face delays that by any measure must be regarded as
unjustified and unreasonable," and yet they have no substantive ability to
challenge them. 48 It is highly unacceptable that "these delays are found
most commonly in cases of child sex assault,"249 as "[c~hildren have the
most difficulty in coping with extended delays." 5 ° "Victims cannot heal
244 It is imperative to note that applying Barker to a victim's right to finality would
not bring about the parade of horribles that so often plague prosecutors' reactions to the
CVRA. Specifically, applying Barker would not "compromise prosecutorial discretion and
independence" by allowing a victim to "effectively dictate policy decisions," "place unknowing,
and unacceptable, restrictions on prosecutors," or "override the professional judgment of the
prosecutor" regarding investigation, timing, disposition, or sentencing, as it was feared would
result from the VRA. S. REP. No. IO8-191, at 74 (2003) (minority views of Senators Leahy,
Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, and Durbin). Contra Twist & Seiden, supra note I9, at
365-66 (arguing that language in the VRA would not cause the aforementioned problems
asserted by the Minority Senators).
245 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. I U6, 120 (1966).
246 Id.
247 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 256 (1966)).
248 Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26, at 326-27 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE
ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § i8. i(b) (3d ed. 2007)).
249 Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
250 Id.
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from the trauma of the crime until the trial is over and the matter has been
concluded." '
CONCLUSION
The Somali sex trafficking case is hardly an outlier. With the advent
of both RICO and the CCE, federal prosecutions have and will grow
increasingly more lengthy and complex."' 2 Delays in prosecutions are
expected and commonplace. Despite our constitutional structure that
assumes defendants above all others seek a speedy trial, defendants
often lack any interest in a speedy resolution."5 3 Indeed, defendants often
have increased incentive to delay proceedings, hoping to wear down the
resolve and resources of both the witnesses and the government. Despite
our constitutional concerns for defendants, victims of violent crime, and
particularly sexually violent crimes, must be protected from a second
wave of victimization through the trial process. Congress endowed victims
with a right to closure, specifically protection from proceedings free
from unreasonable delay. Nothing in this article advocates supplanting
constitutionally endowed defendant rights. Nor does this article suggest
that the CVRA sets victims upon equal footing with either the government
or the defendant. However, Congress has provided victims with a measure
of standing to challenge unreasonable (emphasis on "unreasonable") delay.
Although freedom from unreasonable delay is a specifically enumerated
right, the right has remained largely dormant under the CVRA. 5 4 In fact,
some have speculated that Congress deliberately left key CVRA provisions
undefined because "Congress simply was unwilling to abandon the
existing public prosecution model." '255 Nevertheless, the CVRA specifically
enumerates the victim's right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay
and provides a mechanism for its enforcement through a writ of mandamus.
Furthermore, the CVRA gives courts the authority to define its contours.
251 Id. at 327 (citing Lois HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE
ON VICTIMS OF CRIME: FINAL REPORT (1982), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/
publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87z99.pdf.; Utah This Morning (KSL television broadcast Jan.
6, 1994) (statement of Corrie, rape victim) ("Once the trial was over, both my husband and I
felt we had lost a year and a half of our lives.")).
252 See KENNETH CARLSON & PETER FINN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL OFFENSES AND
OFFENDERS: PROSECUTING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES (1993), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/Digitization/I425Z4NCJRS.pdf ("Whether disposed by plea or trial, CCE cases
took considerably longer to resolve than other drug trafficking cases. Racketeering cases took
somewhat longer to dispose than cases that involved the corresponding underlying offenses,
and approximately 50% longer than the average for all offenses.").
253 See Cassell, Victims' Rights Amendment, supra note 26.
254 See In re Simons, 567 F3d 8oo, 8oo-oI (6th Cit. 2009).
255 Blondel, supra note 19, at 26o.
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Rather than engaging a one-sided struggle to supplant defendants' rights
or evoking the parade of horribles terrifying many prosecutors, this article
attempts a discursive shift toward using existing jurisprudence to give
victims' rights meaning, while simultaneously balancing the rights of all
litigants.
In the final analysis, this article explores how existing forms of
jurisprudence can be used to give victims' rights meaning while at the
same time balancing the rights and needs of all litigants involved in the
criminal justice proceeding. By doing so, this article seeks to complement
rather than supplant any efforts to advance the cause of victims, including
renewed efforts to pass a constitutional amendment. Adding a discursive
shift away from defendant centered rights or the primacy of the government
into an area of balance and compromise is important in two different ways.
First, it shapes the direction of potential reform. Although Congress has
acted through the CVRA, its provisions lie largely dormant, leaving many
to argue that the CVRA has not successfully integrated victims into the
criminal process. By demonstrating the potential for compromise and a
balance of interests, courts and litigants may be more inclined to utilize the
CVRA's provisions.
Secondly, engaging a defendant, victim, or state centered ethos invites
an adversarial relationship between prosecutors, defense attorneys,
victims, and victims' right advocates. By antagonizing litigants and creating
opposing political forces, obvious areas of compromise and coalescence are
perilously ignored. By contrast, grafting Barkeronto victims' right to finality
utilizes centuries of tried and true jurisprudence already devoted to issues
of judicial efficiency and economy. This discursive shift may encourage
other areas of potential compromise within the confines of the CVRA. Only
when that happens, under the current circumstances, can victims be truly
integrated into the centuries-old forum of criminal proceedings.
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